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INTRODUCTION

If I promise to pay your tuition on the condition that you quit smoking
and you accept, we have likely made a contract. Under U.S. law, a contract
is described as a legally enforceable promise or set of promises, I and a
promise is generally enforceable when it is made in exchange for valuable
consideration, 2 such as money, goods, services, and promises to do or
transfer something in the future, including a promise to abstain from
smoking. 3 But if I just promise to pay your tuition, regardless of whether

1.
"A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). In this paper, I assume
that contractual (and moral) obligations to perform may sometimes arise merely from having
made a promise. Compare CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (2d ed. 2015) (arguing
that contracts are legally enforceable promises), with P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND
LAW (1983) (arguing that a promise normally does not create an obligation to perform until the
promisee relies on the promise).
2.
Courts will generally not inquire as to the adequacy of consideration. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("If the requirement of
consideration is met there is no additional requirement of (a) a gain or advantage to the
promisor and loss to the promisee; (b) equivalence of values exchanged, or (c) mutuality of
obligation."). Even so, "gross disparity in the values exchanged may be an important factor in
a determination that a contract is unconscionable and may be sufficient ground, without more,
for denying specific performance." Id. § 208 cmt. c.

3.

See Talbott v. Stemmons' Ex'r, 12 S.W. 297, 298 (1889) ("The right to use and to

enjoy the use of tobacco was a right that belonged to the plaintiff, and not forbidden by law.
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you quit smoking, my promise likely does not create a contract. Promises to
make gifts are precisely because of their donative character not
supported by consideration. 4 Instead, donative promises are typically
enforceable only when the promise reasonably and foreseeably induces the
promisee to rely on the promise.5 In this Article, I will refer to the principle
that donative promises are typically unenforceable in the absence of reliance
as the "donative promise principle." 6
This Article argues that the donative promise principle is an
inegalitarian principle. Donative promises often are made against a
background of social and economic inequality, and the promised gift is often
something the promisee really needs, such as food or shelter. 7 The promised
gift can accordingly function as an inducement to encourage the promisee to
conform to promisor values and expectations. By making promissory
estoppel the primary basis for enforcing donative promises, the donative
promise principle gives the promisee a legal reason to rely on the promise,
namely, the availability of enforcement.8 Thus, when a promisor attempts to
use the promise as a source of influence over the promisee-the promisor
might encourage religious conversion 9 or conformity with gender
stereotypes' 0 the promisee has a legal incentive to submit and thereby

The abandonment of its use may have saved him money, or contributed to his health;
nevertheless the surrender of that right caused the promise [to pay the plaintiff $500], and,
having the right to contract with reference to the subject-matter, the abandonment of the use
was a sufficient consideration to support the promise."); 3 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 7:4 (4th ed. 2015) ("[A]bstaining from smoking and drinking, though in fact in
the particular case a benefit to the promisee's health, finances, and morals and of absolutely no
tangible benefit to the promisor, is a legal detriment insofar as the promisee is concerned, and
if it is requested as such by the promisor, it is sufficient consideration for his promise.").
4.
See infra Section II.A. For a critical view, see Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading,
Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice
Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 298-99 (1992) (arguing that there may be no meaningful
distinction between gifts and bargains).
5.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Even
then, a judge may refuse to enforce the promise if enforcement is not required to avoid
injustice.
6.
Here I follow Melvin Eisenberg's use of the term "donative promise principle." See
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contractand the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 821,
822 (1997).
7. See infra Section II.B.1.
8.
Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.").
9. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 77-81; cf Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365,
367 (Neb. 1898) (holding that a grandfather's promise of financial support was enforceable by
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reasonably and foreseeably rely on the promise." Such incentives not only
risk reinforcing preexisting inequality but are also at odds with
unconscionability, duress, and undue influence doctrines, which aim to
remove legal incentives to engage in improperly induced courses of action.12
The donative promise principle is also inegalitarian with respect to the
promises it leaves outside of contract's reach. Promissory estoppel typically
requires that the plaintiff change her financial position in reliance on the
promise.' 3 Poverty can thus be a barrier to such reliance-the promisee may
not have a job from which to take time off or money to invest in reliance on
the gift. Caretakers who are promised financial support out of gratitude or
recognition of their care may likewise fail to rely on such promises because
they might have continued their caretaking anyway. 14 Yet the unlikelihood
of detrimental reliance does not mean that caretaking and indigent promisees
are any less in need of the promised gifts, nor are they less vulnerable to
promisors' attempts at exploiting that need. By failing to reach such
promises, the donative promise principle leaves such caretaking and poor
promisees dependent on the whim and continued good will of promisors.
In contrast to the standard doctrinal position, this Article argues that
donative promises should sometimes be enforceable in the absence of
reliance. By dispensing with the requirement of actual reliance, such a
regime could counteract the risk of improper promisor influence by
eliminating legal reasons to conform to promisor influence. Enforcement in
the absence of reliance would also vest legal power over performance in
indigent and caretaking promisees. Such power would not only insulate such
promisees from promisor exploitation but would also be valuable as a public
rejection of their otherwise dependent status.
Commentators nevertheless worry that enforcement would obscure the
moral and affective motives of the promisor, leaving it unclear whether the
gift was ultimately given out of, for example, friendship, or from fear of

the granddaughter because the grandfather made the promise to encourage her to stop working
and she quit her job in reliance on the promise).
11.

Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 90(1)

(AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("A

promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.").
12. See infra Section III.A.
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
14. See, e.g., Dewein v. Estate of Dewein, 174 N.E.2d 875, 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961)
(holding that a sister did not detrimentally rely on a promise by her brother to support her "for
life" out of gratitude for taking care of their mother because the sister would have kept taking
care of their mother regardless of the promise).
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legal sanctions." By undermining the communicative power of donative
promises, enforcement would taint the gift-giving practice. 16 Yet the specter
of enforcement need not obscure promisors' motives, at least not any more
so than criminal sanctions might obscure people's motives for stopping their
cars at crosswalks or taking care of their children. Indeed, I argue that
contractual enforcement may actually enhance the authenticity of donative
promissory relationships by mitigating the risk that the promised gift will be
perceived as a carrot to conform to the promisor's wishes.
Enforcement could also support trust in donative promissory
relationships. 17 The more a promisee relies on a promise, the more likely a
promisor is to feel guilty for breaking the promise.'" Accordingly, promisees
will tend to strategically rely in anticipation of such "psychological lock-in"
in a legal regime where promises are not enforced.19 I argue that strategic
reliance can be manipulative and that the existence of such a strategy may
give a promisor reason to doubt the authenticity of the promisee. Strategic
reasons to over-rely and, indeed, to rely at all-may therefore compromise
even the most well-intentioned of relationships. By obviating strategic
reasons to rely, legal enforcement can enhance parties' power to
autonomously shape their relationship and support the trust upon which
promising depends.
Donative promises are, however, not homogeneous. Gift giving occurs
within a variety of settings that may be characterized by different power
dynamics and moral values, some of which may be ill-served by contract
principles. To illustrate, I discuss one such case: promises to volunteer one's
labor. While commentary on the donative promise principle focuses on

15. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 848-49. While Eisenberg here aims to offer a
moral argument against enforcing donative promises, see Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 840, in
other works Eisenberg and other legal theorists dispute whether it would be unduly
economically costly to administer enforcement of donative promises. Compare Lon Fuller,
Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 815 (1941) (arguing that enforcement of
donative promises poses evidentiary problems), and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative
Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-14 (1979) (discussing evidentiary challenges to enforcing
informal and formal donative promises generally), with Andrew Kull, Reconsidering
GratuitousPromises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 51-54 (1992) (arguing to the contrary).
16. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 848.
17. Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, Promises, Reliance, and Psychological
Lock-In (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 15-17, 2016).
18. See generally id. (examining whether promisees overinvest in order to make their
promisors more willing to keep their promises in a legal regime that does not enforce
promises).
19. Id. at 44.
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promises of money and interpersonal caretaking, 20 volunteer work has
received much less, if any, attention. This is regrettable because volunteer
work is potentially a paradigm illustration of how contract can be a poor fit
for donative promises. As principles for market labor, service and
employment contract principles may compromise the associational and
personal values of volunteer work. For example, duties of flawless
performance under service contracts may undermine volunteer work's
potential to be inclusive with respect to skill and ability.21 Contract law more
broadly may therefore need to be adjusted to accommodate donative
promises.
This Article develops these arguments by inquiring how contract shapes
power and social ties within donative promising practices. 22 Part II provides
an overview of the scope and content of the donative promise principle and
the character of the reliance it requires. Part III argues that the donative
promise principle makes for an inegalitarian contract law. Part IV argues
that enforcing donative promises independent of reliance could lessen
inequality within the promissory relationship and among wealthy and poorer
promisees. Part V argues that enforcement in the absence of reliance also
serves promissory authenticity and trust. Part VI uses the underexamined
case of volunteer work to illustrate how enforcement must also be calibrated
to heterogeneity within donative promising.
II.

THE DONATIVE PROMISE PRINCIPLE

Under the donative promise principle, a promise to make a gift is
typically not enforceable unless the promisee has detrimentally relied on that
promise. This Part provides a doctrinal explanation of the content and scope
of the donative promise principle. In Section A, I argue that donative
promises are normally not enforceable under a consideration theory.
Donative promises purport to be made from an affective or moral motive,

20. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155 (1989)
(analyzing the formal and substantive differences between donative transfers and bargained-for
exchanges).
21. Cf Sabine Tsuruda, Volunteer Work, Inclusivity, and Social Equality, in THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR LAW (Hugh Collins et al. eds., forthcoming)
(arguing that volunteer work's skill-based inclusivity can provide a legal and moral basis for
distinguishing volunteer work from employment for purposes of wage and hour law).
22. This methodology contrasts with the two dominant strategies for criticizing the
donative promise principle: a public policy in favor of charitable giving, or alternatively,
rejecting any meaningful distinction between bargains and gifts. See, e.g., Baron, supra note
20 (arguing that gifts are forms of exchanges and that the consideration doctrine devalues gifts
by treating gifts differently than bargains).
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such as friendship or civility, and are neither induced by nor conditioned on
an exchange. Thus, under the donative promise principle, promissory
estoppel is the primary legal theory for enforcing a donative promise.
Charitable subscriptions, however, are sometimes enforced under a
consideration theory, and hence constitute a significant but narrow
exception. In Section B, I explain that donative promises can induce
detrimental reliance either by empowering the promisee to pursue a new
project or by influencing the promisee to conform to promisor values. I then
address donative promises that tend to be unenforceable under a reliance
theory, using promises to caretakers and poor promisees as paradigm
examples.
A.

Consideration

A promise is typically legally enforceable when made in exchange for
valuable consideration23 -for
some bargained-for good,2 4 service,
forbearance, or promise of later performance. 25 But part of what makes a

23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
24. "To constitute consideration, a performance or return promise must be bargained
for." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
25.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§§

71(3), 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

The extent to which the consideration doctrine should be the sole or even a primary basis for
contract enforcement is controversial. For a moral argument in favor of the consideration
doctrine playing such a role, see, for example, Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (arguing that contract law concerns agreements to
transfer legal entitlements, that the consent of a holder of a legal entitlement to be legally
bound to transfer that entitlement is required for the transfer of that entitlement to be legally
valid, and that the presence of bargained-for consideration can manifest such consent to be
bound). For an argument that promissory morality, rather than the presence or absence of
consideration, should guide enforcement in contract law, see FRIED, supra note 1, at 28-39 ("I
conclude that the standard doctrine of consideration, which is illustrated by the preceding ten
quite typical common law cases, does not pose a challenge to my conception of contract law as
rooted in promise, for the simple reason that that doctrine is too internally inconsistent to offer
an alternative at all."). Lord Mansfield famously sought to abolish the doctrine of
consideration in favor of a doctrine of "moral consideration":
Where a man is under a legal or equitable obligation to pay, the law implies a
promise, though none was ever actually made. A fortiori, a legal or equitable duty is
a sufficient consideration for an actual promise. Where a man is under a moral
obligation, which no Court of Law or Equity can enforce, and promises, the honesty
and rectitude of the thing is a consideration.
Hawkes v. Saunders, 1 Cowp. 289, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 1091 (1782). For a discussion of the
evolution of Lord Mansfield's ideas on consideration, see generally Bernard L. Shientag, Lord
Mansfield Revisited A Modern Assessment, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1941).
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promise donative is that no such exchange induces the promise.26 A
foundation does not ask for payment as a condition of providing vaccines; a
volunteer does not work for a wage. 27 Rather, donative promises are
voluntary promises to transfer something-a good, service, money, real
estate-from an affective or moral motive, such as love or civic duty. 28
For example, in Dougherty v. Salt, an aunt gave a signed promissory
note for $3,000 to her eight-year-old nephew for "value received." 29 The
court held that the note was not sufficient evidence of consideration. 30 The
aunt had given the plaintiff the note because "she loved [her nephew] very
much" and "was going to take care of that child." 31 Judge Cardozo explained
that "[a] note so given is not made for 'value received,' however its maker
may have labeled it." 32 The court thus concluded that the note was an
unenforceable promise of a gift. 33

As Dougherty illustrates, people often use gift promises to express
ongoing love and support and not to purchase something or induce any
particular course of action as a condition of making the promise. Of course,
a gift promise may not always be so well-intentioned. People may use
donative promises to exercise improper influence over other people's lives.34

26. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
("One of the functions of the doctrine of consideration is to deny enforcement to a promise to
make a gift."). This is in contrast to promises of gifts where the donee is a third-party
beneficiary. Such promises are typically bargained for. For example, suppose A sells land to B
in exchange for B giving C, A's niece, one of B's paintings. B's promise to give the painting
to C is bargained for insofar as B's promise is the price for A's land. See id § 302 cmt. c. The
painting may nonetheless be a gift from A to C, and hence, B's promise to A is a promise to
transfer a gift (ultimately from A) to C. I do not discuss such promises of gifts here, as such
promises are not the target of the donative promise principle. By "donative promise," I instead
mean to refer to promises of gifts from the donor-promisor to the donee-promisee.
27. See infra note 38; cf Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 842-44 (explaining that the
reciprocity that may be expected by a donative promisor is unlike consideration, which is
regarded by the promisor as a "requirement" for performance).
28. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 842 ("[A] gift is a transfer that is made, or at least
purports to be made, not for economic gain, but for affective reasons or to satisfy moral duties
or aspirations, and which is not expressly conditioned on a reciprocal exchange, so that any
later exchange that occurs is not, or at least does not purport to be, viewed by the parties as the
price of the transfer."). By "voluntary" I mean that the transfer is not already required as a
matter of legal duty at the time the promise is made. Thus, paying one's taxes out of civic duty
does not count as a gift.
29. Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94 (N.Y. 1919).
30. See id. at 95.
31. Id at 94.
32. Id at 95 ("Nothing is consideration that is not regarded as such by both parties.").
33. See id. at 95 ("The transaction thus revealed admits of one interpretation, and one
only. The note was the voluntary and unenforcible [sic] promise of an executory gift.").
34. See infra Section II.B.1.
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But even in such cases, what makes the promise a donative promise is that
the promise still purports to express affective motives and the promisor does
not communicate to the promisee that performance requires the promisee's
submission to influence.35 A donative promise is thus unlikely to be
enforceable under a theory of consideration. 36
1.

Reciprocity and Exchange

To be sure, a promisor may have a variety of expectations with respect
to the promised gift and her relationship with the promisee. The foundation
might reasonably expect the cooperation of the community; the volunteer
might reasonably expect that the cost of the materials she uses be shared.3 7
A donor might also hope that, should she ever fall on hard times, her
community would help her as well. And of course, donative promisors might
reasonably expect gratitude.38 In each of these examples, it also seems
plausible that those expectations might be known by and perhaps even
communicated to-the promisee.
But it does not follow that an expectation of cooperation, mutual
support, or gratitude should be understood as the price for the promise.39 A
person may help a friend move into a new apartment, with rides to and from

35. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 367 (Neb. 1898) (holding that a
grandfather made his granddaughter a donative promise that was not supported by
consideration even though his clear and express intention was to "influence" her to quit her
job).
36. Some courts have adopted a slightly stronger position and suggested that, as a
definitional matter, gifts are not supported by consideration. See, e.g., Bleick v. N.D. Dep't of
Human Servs., 861 N.W.2d 138, 143 (N.D. 2015) (explaining that "[a] gift is a voluntary
transfer of property made without consideration").
37. Cf Carlisle v. T & R Excavating, Inc., 704 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that a promise to perform services free of charge on the condition that the cost of
materials was reimbursed was a gift promise not supported by consideration).
38. For a discussion of challenges that the ethics of ingratitude may pose to enforcing
donative promises, see Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 13-15. For a discussion of moral
challenges surrounding creating and discharging debts of gratitude, see generally Barbara
Herman, Being Helped and Being Grateful: Imperfect Duties, the Ethics of Possession, andthe
Unity ofMorality, 109 J. PHIL. 391 (2012).
39. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 842-44 (explaining that the reciprocity that may be
expected by a donative promisor is unlike consideration, which is regarded by the promisor as
a "requirement" for performance). I thus agree with Jane Baron that gifts are often not "onesided transactions," but reject her conclusion that we should assimilate gifts to exchanges and
gift-giving practices to "non-commodity markets." Baron, supra note 20, at 196-98; cf Rose,
supra note 4, at 309 (arguing that there is "leakage" between gifts and bargains). Even so, I am
ultimately sympathetic to Baron's position that the law's differential treatment of gifts and
exchanges may be unprincipled and may actually undermine the values of gift-giving
practices. See Baron, supra note 20, at 200-02; infra Parts IV and V.
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the airport, and the friend may in turn help out in similar ways. Such
reciprocity is often a way of showing concern and taking an interest in a
friend's life. If the friendship becomes one-sided, it may of course be
reasonable for the help and support to slow or cease, yet that may be because
the failure of reciprocity indicates a defect in their relationship, such as
insensitivity or callous selfishness, rather than merely because someone has
not upheld their end of a bargain. 40
Expectations of reciprocity thus do not imply that donative promises are
bargained for or mere elements in exchanges. On the contrary, reciprocity is
often an expression of the freely offered and morally-motived mutual
support that enables a variety of relationships to flourish, such as friendships
and communities. Assimilating expectations of cooperation, future help, and
gratitude to exchange suggests a tit-for-tat conception of reciprocity that
oversimplifies and impoverishes the moral richness of donative relationships
and associational life more broadly. 4 1 A legal regime that aims to give effect
to promisor intent, and that aims to leave space for a diverse associational
life, should be wary of importing into the law too narrow a view of donative
promising; gifts seem to be neither one-sided nor reducible to market-like
exchanges.
2.

Naming Rights and Obligations to Use Donations for a
CharitablePurpose

There is one important qualification to the principle that gift promises
are generally not supported by consideration. Courts have sometimes
enforced charitable pledges to institutions on the theory that the pledges
were supported by consideration, either in the form of naming rights or in
the form of the institution's promise to use the donation for a charitable
purpose.
For example, in Allegheny College v. National ChautauquaCity Bank of
Jamestown, the promisor made a charitable pledge to Allegheny College to

40.

Such as when a buyer might rightfully reject defective goods. See U.C.C.

§ 2-601

(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977).

41.

It may certainly be true that some cultures engage in patterns of gift giving that have

a more tit-for-tat structure common to the marketplace. See Baron, supra note 20, at 194-95. If
some gift-giving practices resemble market exchanges in practically every way, I would not be
opposed to enforcing promises within such practices under a theory of consideration. Unlike
commentators who worry that contracts may commodify, see infra Section V.A., I ultimately
argue that enforcement can support the affective and moral purposes of donative promises
(when they have such purposes), and thus the idea that gifts may sometimes be similar to
exchanges does not pose a problem for my position.
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set up a memorial fund in the promisor's name. 42 The court held that in
accepting the pledge, the college assumed a duty to create and maintain the
fund, and that duty was a sufficient legal detriment to constitute
consideration for the charitable pledge. 43
Courts have also enforced charitable subscriptions on a consideration
theory even when no specific purpose was requested by the promisor. 44 For
example, in In re Morton Shoe Co., the court held that the promisee's
agreement to "apply the pledged amounts in accordance with the charitable
purposes set forth in its charter ... [was] sufficient consideration to support
the [charitable pledge]." 45
Cases like Allegheny and Morton Shoe illustrate that donative promises
are sometimes enforced on a consideration theory where there is some
evidence that the nonprofit institution agreed to certain terms as a condition
for receiving the donation. 46 But this is a narrow phenomenon applying
largely to charitable subscriptions, and courts and scholars alike have
claimed that the exception is in fact a fiction used to facilitate public policy
in favor of charitable subscriptions. 47 For example, William Drennan
explains that

42. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua City Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173, 174
(N.Y. 1927).
43. See id.
44. In re Morton Shoe Co., 40 B.R. 948, 951 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
45. Id.; cf Ladies' Collegiate Inst. v. French, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 196, 201 (1860) ("It is
held that by accepting such a subscription the promisee agrees on his part with the subscribers,
that he will hold and appropriate the funds subscribed in conformity with the terms and objects
of the subscription, and thus mutual and independent promises are made, which constitute a
legal and sufficient consideration for each other. They are thus held to rest upon a well settled
principle in respect to concurrent promises.").
46. But see Mount Sinai Hosp. of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So. 2d 484, 485,
486-87 (Fla. 1974) (holding that a charitable pledge made "[i]n consideration of and to induce
the subscription of others," but without reference to a "specific purpose" for the funds was not
enforceable in the case where the donor prematurely dies). Courts have been reluctant to treat
actions by charities that were not part of any agreement involving the donation as
consideration. See, e.g., In re Bashas' Inc., 468 B.R. 381, 383 (D. Ariz. 2012) (holding that
publicly honoring the promisor's charitable commitment was not consideration for the
promisor's charitable pledge in part because the promisor did not agree to make the pledge "in
exchangefor" the acknowledgement).
47. See, e.g., More Game Birds in Am. v. Boettger, 14 A.2d 778, 780 (N.J. 1940)
(explaining that in "cases where public and charitable interests are involved, the courts lean
towards sustaining such contracts, sometimes on consideration which in a purely business
contract might be regarded as questionable," thus suggesting that "public policy forms the
basis upon which consideration is spelled out in order to impose liability on charitable
subscriptions." (quoting N.J. Orthopedic Hosp. & Dispensary v. Wright, 95 N.J.L. 462, 464
(N.J. 1921))); Jewish Fed'n of Cent. N.J. v. Barondess, 560 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1989) (finding that the statute of frauds is not a defense to enforcing a charitable
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the charity's obligation could only be consideration if it provides a
benefit to the donor or is a detriment to the charity. The charity
cannot provide a private benefit to an individual donor without
jeopardizing its tax-exempt status, and there is no detriment to the
charity in receiving money to fulfill its charitable mission.
Presumably, a charity would simply reject the contribution if a
donor wanted the donation to go toward a specific project that the
charity did not wish to undertake. Perhaps most important, the
charity already has a preexisting duty to use all funds received for a
charitable purpose. 48

For my purposes here, not much turns on whether a charitable
subscription is "disguised as a contract" when the subscription is enforced
under a consideration theory. 49 The important doctrinal point is rather that
some donative promises are, at least superficially, enforced on a
consideration theory, but only narrowly and on uncertain grounds.
B. PromissoryEstoppel
Donative promises are typically not supported by consideration. Thus, if
donative promises are enforced, they are more likely to be enforced on a
theory of promissory estoppel. 0

subscription because "[i]f a charitable subscription is disguised as a contract in order to
effectuate a public policy, logic would dictate that the law should not then permit the
institution of a contractual defense to undermine that policy"); see William A. Drennan,
Charitable Pledges: Contracts of Confusion, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 477, 487 (2015)
(describing the application of the consideration doctrine to enforce charitable pledges as a
"judicial concoction[]").
48. Drennan, supra note 47, at 488; cf LORD, supra note 3, § 7:50 ("A gift is by
definition not a bargain, and a promise to make a gift is not converted into a bargain by the
donee's promise to accept the gift, or by its acceptance of all or part of gift.").
49. Jewish Fed'n, 560 A.2d at 1354.
50. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 367 (Neb. 1898) (holding that a
promissory note was a valid contract without consideration because the plaintiff had been
induced to abandon her paid employment in reliance on the note); cf In re Morton Shoe Co.,
40 B.R. 948, 950 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) ("I believe it is firmly established Massachusetts law
that an action to enforce a charitable subscription is enforceable based on a consideration or
reliance theory."). I use the terms "detrimental reliance," "reliance theory," and "promissory
estoppel" interchangeably to refer to the contract enforcement theory that falls under these
names. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981) ("Obligations and remedies based on reliance are not peculiar to the law of contracts.
This Section is often referred to in terms of 'promissory estoppel,' a phrase suggesting an
extension of the doctrine of estoppel.").
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Inducing Reliance

In the context of donative promises, promissory estoppel demands a
different orientation toward the power relations between donor-promisors
and donee-promisees than a consideration theory. A consideration analysis
of a donative promise tends to be focused on whether the formal
requirements of consideration are met." Of course, if that initial hurdle is
passed, it may then be appropriate to investigate relative power as required
by duress, 5 2 undue influence, 3 and unconscionability doctrines.5 4 But since
donative promises often fail to meet the requirements of consideration, a
consideration analysis of a donative promise will tend to leave the power
relations of the parties opaque.
In contrast, a reliance analysis inquires into the power of the promiseand thus, of the promisor to shape the activities and choices of the
promisee.56 Promissory estoppel generally requires showing that "the
promisor should [have] reasonably expect[ed] to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee" in making the promise, that the
promise in fact induce[d] such reliance, and that "injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise." 7 Hence, it is not enough that the

51. See supra Section II.A.
52. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-76 (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (explaining that duress by physical force prevents formation of a contract while duress
by an improper threat that leaves the party with "no reasonable alternative" is voidable by that
party).
53. See generally id. § 177(2) (explaining that a contract may be voided by a party
whose "manifestation of assent [was] induced by undue influence by the other party. . . .").
54. See generally id. § 208 cmt. c (explaining that if a court finds a contract is
unconscionable at the time of formation, a court may decline to enforce the contract in whole
or in part, and that factors for determining unconscionable conduct include defects in the
bargaining process and "gross disparity" in the values exchanged).
55. Orit Gan argues that contract law should be responsive to power dynamics and
argues that promissory estoppel should be understood as a doctrine that helps to "guarantee[]
the right to contract and access to contract" for promisees who are in "relations of power or
trust that impact their ability to form a binding contract under the bargain theory." Orit Gan,
Promissory Estoppel: A Callfor a More Inclusive ContractLaw, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
47, 79, 82 (2013). I do not dispute Gan's claim that promissory estoppel can have these
empowering functions (indeed, as I argue, contract more broadly empowers the promisee). I
instead depart from Gan with respect to the fit and adequacy of promissory estoppel for
extending contractual rights to donee-promisees. As I argue, promissory estoppel may leave
many donee-promisees vulnerable to improper promisor influence and actually creates
perverse incentives to submit to promisors' attempts at exercising such influence. See infra
Part III.
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(discussing that the promise should induce the promisee's actions).
57. Id.
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promisee merely rely on the promise; making the promise must induce the
58
promisee's reliance.

For example, in Harvey v. Dow, the plaintiffs parents owned a large
tract of land.59 Growing up, the plaintiff and her brother had often discussed
building their homes on the land indeed this was a common topic of
conversation within the family as a whole-and promises were made to
leave the children "some land in the future." 60 The plaintiff eventually
financed and built a home on a portion of the land with the help and
encouragement of her parents, but her parents ultimately refused to give her
the deed to the land. 6' The court found that a specific promise to convey the
land could be implied from the parents' conduct and concluded that it
"would seem to be eminently reasonable and foreseeable" for the plaintiff to
have built her home in reliance on that promise in light of the parents'
support. 62 The court accordingly held that the parents had made a promise of
land that supported the plaintiff s claim of promissory estoppel. 63
The court's reasoning in Harvey suggests that the donative promise at
issue induced reliance because it empowered the plaintiff to pursue an
important life project. Not only did her parents' promise give her reason to
believe that she would one day own some of the family land, but the
supportive nature of the promissory relationship itself empowered her to act
on that promise:
Against the backdrop of the parties' general understanding that [the
plaintiff] would one day receive property as a gift or inheritance
from her parents, she decided to build a new house on their land.
[Her father] agreed to the location, obtained a building permit to
allow construction at that site, and not only acquiesced in the house
being built, but built a large portion of it himself. 64
Harvey illustrates that donative promises are not always inert; they can
facilitate going relationships of support that empower promisees to pursue

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Harvey v. Dow, 962 A.2d 322, 323 (Me. 2008).
Id
See id. at 324.
Id at 327.
Id.
Id at 325-26.
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freely chosen projects they might not have been able to pursue on their
own. 65

The empowerment potential of the promise in Harvey depended on the
parents having something of value to the plaintiff. If the parents had not had
the land or if the plaintiff had been indifferent to the land, the parents would
not have been able to make the promise, or the promise would not have had
the potential to shape the plaintiffs life plans by encouraging her to build.
To be sure, the plaintiff might have been induced to build even if she did not
want the land. People are vulnerable to the feelings of their close
associates.66 If the plaintiff had felt that her parents would have been
disappointed if she did not build, and her parents had in some way
communicated that to her, the plaintiff might have felt pressure to build. But
under these modified facts, the potential for the promise to reasonably and
foreseeably induce reliance still lies in the parents' power over the
plaintiff. 67 The centrality of the promisor's power in inducing reliance points
to a second mode of inducement: improper influence.
In Ricketts v. Scothorn, the plaintiff earned $10 per week in a store. 68
One day the plaintiffs grandfather visited the store and gave her a
promissory note for $2,000.69 The grandfather told the plaintiff, "I have

fixed out something that you have not got to work any more [sic] ....
7
[N]one of my grandchildren work, and you don't have to."o
The plaintiff

then embraced her grandfather and immediately resigned. 7 But over the
course of the following year, the grandfather was only able to pay interest on
the note. 72 After a year of unemployment, the plaintiff returned to work with

65. See id at 323; cf Salsbury v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1974)
(stating that "[c]haritable subscriptions often serve the public interest by making possible
projects which otherwise could never come about").
66. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(discussing when undue influence from family members, friends, clerics, and other people in
special positions of trust can make a contract voidable).
67. Contract law is sensitive to the emotional power that promisors can exercise over
promisees by virtue of being in a close relationship. For example, a contract may be voided by
a party whose "manifestation of assent [was] induced by undue influence by the other
party .... " Id. § 177(2). The Restatement defines undue influence as "unfair persuasion of a
party who is under the domination of the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of
the relation between them is justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner
inconsistent with his welfare." Id. § 177(1). Familial relations will often fall in the latter
category. See id. at cmt. a.
68. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 367 (Neb. 1898).
69. Id. at 365-66.
70. Id at 366.
71. Id
72. Id
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the help of her grandfather. 73 The court held that the promissory note,
though not supported by consideration, was enforceable against the
grandfather's estate because the grandfather had "intentionally influenced
the plaintiff to alter her position for the worse on the faith of the note being
paid when due." 74

There is a sense in which Ricketts is susceptible to being read as an
example of inducement by empowerment, similar to the inducement in
Harvey. The grandfather claimed that he gave the plaintiff the promissory
note to effectuate her independence by eliminating her financial need to
work.71 Such a purpose might indicate that the promise induced the
plaintiffs reliance by giving her the means to choose whether to work and
thereby empowering her decision to resign.76
Ricketts is also open to an alternative reading. Recall that in executing
the note, the grandfather did not merely want to place the choice of whether
to work in the plaintiffs hands but to encourage her to quit.7 7 Even if the
plaintiff had liked her job, under such circumstances she might have
reasonably felt pressure to quit. She may have wanted to please her
grandfather out of love and a sense of gratitude, or defer to him out of
respect. Or perhaps she simply felt pressure to conform to the values and
wishes of an older and financially powerful authority figure within her
family.78 Under any of these hypotheses, the promise would have induced
reliance, not by empowering the plaintiff, but rather by influencing the
plaintiff to change her life in conformity with her grandfather's idea of how
the plaintiff should live. Indeed, the court concluded that such influence was
precisely his intention.79

73. Id
74. Id at 367.
75. Id at 366.
76. Note that the promise may induce reliance by empowering that choice even if the
promised gift was not transferred during the life of the grandfather. What matters is that, at the
time of the plaintiffs choice to resign, she regarded the promise as a reason to believe she
would not need to work anymore. See id. at 367 (explaining that the grandfather suggested that
the plaintiff might not work by offering the sum, but the ultimate decision to act was the
plaintiffs).
77. See id (explaining that the grandfather "doubtless desired that she should give up
her occupation").
78. The plaintiff might have also thought at the time that accepting her grandfather's
note was a more secure financial option than her job and accordingly may have wanted to
please him to ensure her good standing and his long-term support. See id. (explaining that the
grandfather essentially suggested that "she might abandon her employment, and rely in the
future upon the bounty which he promised").
79. Id.
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These alternative hypotheses about the plaintiffs motives are
speculative, but they help to explain the court's theory that the plaintiff was
influenced rather than empowered to quit her job.s0 These alternative
hypotheses also illustrate another face of donative promises: While donative
promises may empower people to pursue freely chosen projects, donative
promises can also have a disempowering effect on the promisor by offering
a carrot namely, the gift to conform to the promisor's values. A donative
promise may accordingly operate as a vehicle for manipulation and other
forms of improper influence. While it is possible that the grandfather's
promise empowered the plaintiff to choose to quit, it is also possible that the
grandfather's promise was an effective means by which he pressured her to
conform to a gendered and classist distaste for "working girl[s]."I'
The risk that a donative promise will induce reliance through improper
promisor influence is not limited to interpersonal promises or middle-class
families. Donative promising practices occur against a background of social
and economic inequality.8 2 Indeed, it is precisely because there are people
who need vaccines-or need the education, the food, or the shelter but
cannot secure them by purchase, through employment, or from the
government that organizations like UNICEF and the Gates Foundation offer
to provide them for free. 83 Under such conditions of need and inequality,

80. Id. An influence interpretation also comports with the often dependent social and
economic status of nineteenth-century middle class women, and the law's likely role in
reifying that status. See Mary Louise Fellows, His to Give; His to Receive; Hers to Trust: A
Response to Carol M Rose, 44 FLA. L. REV. 329, 334-36 (1992) (arguing that the court may
have been mistaken about the plaintiff s motives in Ricketts and that the court's framing of her
choice as one made under the influence of her grandfather may simply reflect gendered
stereotypes about women's lack of agency). Although I do not dispute Fellows's interpretation
of the facts, as a critical matter it may also be valuable to be open to the likely possibility that
the plaintiff indeed was influenced and that gift promises may have (and perhaps have often
had) a disempowering influence on certain donee-promisees.
81. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 367. See Fellows, supra note 80, at 336 ("For some reason it
bothered the grandfather that his granddaughter was working. It may have been because her
working indicated publicly that he was not financially able to provide for his family .... .").
82. Compare, for instance, Bill and Melinda Gates with the homeless residents of
Washington State. While the Gates Foundation is often associated with philanthropy abroad, it
also directs a substantial percentage of its resources to domestic philanthropy. See 2015
Annual Report, GATES FOUNDATION, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/Resource
s-and-Media/Annual-Reports/Annual-Report-2015 (last visited Nov. 8, 2017). For an overview
of the Gates Foundation's domestic homelessness projects, see Washington State
Homelessness andFamily Stability, GATES FOUNDATION, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Wh
at-We-Do/US-Program/Washington-State/Homelessness-and-Family-Stability
(last visited
Nov. 8, 2017).
83. Cf Immunization, UNICEF USA, https://www.unicefusa.org/mission/survival/immu
nization (last visited Nov. 8, 2017); Vaccine Delivery, GATES FOUNDATION,
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donee-promisees are vulnerable to feeling pressure to conform to the values
of charitable institutions.8 4 Refugees may, for instance, feel pressure to
adopt a religious charity's faith to access basic goods and shelter." Doneepromisees might also reasonably feel pressure to tailor their self-presentation
to potentially disempowering victim tropes. 86 In the international
development context, there is evidence that some religious charities may be
using their position of trust and the need of recipients to pressure religious
conversion. 7 While U.S. contract law may not govern all such cases, they
illustrate the potential for manipulation and improper influence in donative
practices, and we can imagine like cases might happen domestically."
2.

Caretakingand Indigence

Donative promises can thus induce reliance by empowering the
promisee to realize important life projects, but may also induce reliance by
enabling the promisor to improperly influence the promisee to conform to
the promisor's values. 8 9 In both cases, promissory estoppel affords some
protection for promisees who substantially change their lives by acting on
the reliance that donative promises invite. In Harvey, enforcement of the

http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Development/Vaccine-Delivery
(last
visited Nov. 8, 2017).
84. See, e.g., Josie Ensor, The Muslim Refugees Converting to Christianity 'to Find
Safety,' TELEGRAPH (Jan. 30, 2017, 12:24 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/
01/30/muslim-refugees-converting-christianity-find-safety/ (finding that some refugees claim
to have converted to Christianity to gain benefits from Christian charities).
85. Id.
86. For a discussion of how a variety of legal and nonlegal interventions may encourage
self-presentation as a victim, see generally Jasmine Phillips, Comment, Black Girls and the
(Im)Possibilities of a Victim Trope: The Intersectional Failures of Legal and Advocacy
Interventions in the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors in the United States, 62 UCLA
L. REv. 1642 (2015).
87. See, e.g., Saroj Jayasinghe, Faith-BasedNGOs and Healthcare in Poor Countries:
A PreliminaryExploration of Ethical Issues, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 623, 625 (2007) (arguing that
NGOs that combine religious proselyting with healthcare may "exploit the vulnerability of
individuals and communities" by abusing or being insensitive to their "asymmetric power
relationship" with aid recipients and explaining that similar concerns arise with respect to
secular organizations that seek to advance a political message).
88. There is an emerging critical literature on the compatibility of charities with
democracy. See, e.g., PHILANTHROPY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS,
VALUES (Rob Reich et al. eds., 2016); Rob Reich, Repugnant to the Whole Idea of
Democracy? On the Role of Foundations in Democratic Societies, 49 POL. SCI. & POL. 466,
466-68 (2016) (discussing how private foundations have plutocratic elements that pose a
challenge for justifying support for private foundations in a democratic society).
89. See supra Section II.B.1.
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promise was predicated on the plaintiffs decision to build her dream
home; 90 in Ricketts, enforcement was predicated on the plaintiffs decision
to forgo valuable employment. 91 Once such promisees rely and thereby
acquire a right to performance, the promisees are legally protected from
subsequent attempts by the promisor to use the promise to covertly control
the promisee, as the promisor no longer retains a general legal permission to
unilaterally retract or worsen the terms of the promise.
Yet many donative promises do not have the facilitation of such
investments and changes as their aim. For example, a brother may promise
to financially support his sister while she cares for their elderly relative, 92
and a foundation may promise to administer free vaccinations to a poor
neighborhood. In these cases, the promises aim to support a preexisting
project-such as caretaking or maintaining a baseline of health and,
accordingly, the promisees might not take new financial risks in reliance on
the promise. The sister may have been taking care of their relative for a long
time and might continue to do so regardless of the donative promise, even at
great personal financial costs. Similarly, the residents of the neighborhood
might not have forgone other opportunities to get vaccinated (perhaps that
was the only opportunity they had), and may not have otherwise relied, such
as by taking time off work. Nevertheless, the promisees in these cases may
still depend on the promised gift to meet their basic needs. In turn, such
donative promises can empower promisees by freeing up time and energy to
pursue projects apart from meeting basic needs-such as looking for work,
taking care of children, or going back to school but may also operate as
vehicles for improper influence given the importance of the gift.
Donative promises of basic goods and financial support may thus
facilitate relationships between promisors and promisees with power
dynamics similar to those at work in Harvey and Ricketts, 93 even when the
promises do not induce promisees to make costly or risky changes in their
lives. Promissory estoppel, however, requires precisely such a change.
Reliance is protected by promissory estoppel only when the promise induces
the promisee to do something different than she would have done
otherwise, 94 and that change in circumstances typically must be financially
costly.95

90. See Harvey v. Dow, 962 A.2d 322, 325-36 (Me. 2008).
91. See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 366 (Neb. 1898).
92. See Dewein v. Estate of Dewein, 174 N.E.2d 875, 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
93. See supra Section II.B.1.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
("[a promise to make a gift] is ordinarily enforced by virtue of the promisee's reliance only if
his conduct . . . involves a definite and substantial change of position which would not have
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For example, in Dewein v. Estate of Dewein, a brother promised his
sister to "take care of [her] for life" out of apparent gratitude for the many
years of care his sister administered to their family. 96 The court held the
promise unenforceable on a theory of promissory estoppel because the sister
had not shown that "she had ever intended to act otherwise than the way she
did." 9 7
Similarly, in Ervin v. Ervin, an ex-husband wrote to his ex-wife
suggesting that he would pay for their son to attend college and that she had
"nothing to be concerned about." 98 The court held that even if the letter
communicated a promise to pay for their son's tuition, the ex-wife had not
relied on the promise to her financial detriment. 99 The ex-wife had failed to
show that she enrolled their son in college in reliance on the promise. 100 It
was of no consequence to the court that "her income and expenses showed
that she was unable to provide for the cost of the son's education," and thus
would have, colloquially speaking, relied on the promised financial support
to meet her basic needs and to actually cover the costs of her son's
education.' 0 ' Just as the court in Dewein denied the promissory estoppel

&

occurred if the promise had not been made"). The Restatement qualifies this general principle
by noting that sometimes "other policies" support a detrimental reliance claim. Id. Examples
of such policies include the following: prohibitions on unjust enrichment (permitting the
promisor to "reclaim the subject of the promised gift after the promisee has improved it") and
public policy in favor of charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements. Id. Some
commentators dispute the requirement of actual reliance. Compare Edward Yorio & Steve
Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 167 (1991) (arguing that
promissory estoppel does not require actual reliance), with Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 852-65
(arguing that actual reliance is required for promissory estoppel). I do not take any stand in this
larger debate, but, as I argue, promissory estoppel claims to enforce donative promises in
particular do seem to require actual and substantial reliance.
95. See Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 709,
743-44 (citing Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App'x 246, 256-57 (6th Cir. 2005); Calabro
v. Calabro, 15 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)).
96. Dewein, 174 N.E.2d at 875, 876.
97. Id. at 877 ("Surely, there can be no presumption or inference that after living with
[her] mother for so many years, she was now about to desert her in the time of her greatest
need, but was persuaded to stay 'in reliance on promises made to her."'); cf Steve Thel
Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1050
(1992) ("A promise motivated by a past favor or by some other sense of obligation is not
covered by the doctrines of consideration and promissory estoppel, which screen for promises
that are made with a view to influencing the promisee's future behavior.").
98. Ervin v. Ervin, 458 A.2d 342, 343 (R.I. 1983).
99. Id. at 345.
100. Id.
101. Id. To be sure, the ex-wife was "unemployed," but this fact appears to play no role
in the court's reasoning. See id. The court did not, for instance, say that it would not be unjust
to not enforce because she could have gotten a job. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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claim because the plaintiff would have still cared for her parent,102 so the
court in Ervin found no detrimental reliance because the ex-wife continued
supporting her son as she had always done, notwithstanding the breached
promise.' 03 Ervin and Dewein thus illustrate how the donative promise
principle may leave many donative promises made in support of caretaking
unenforceable. 104
Because promissory estoppel typically requires showing that the
promisee suffers a financial detriment in relying on the promise, it will also
be unlikely that particularly poor donee-promisees will have enforceable
contract rights to donative promises of basic goods.'0 o It will, for example,
be hard for a homeless person to detrimentally rely on a promise of shelter,
since that person may have no other alternatives and no financial means to
make investments in reliance on such a promise. It is difficult to rely when
you have little to invest or to lose.
3.

Enforcement Without Actual Reliance? Restatement 90(2)

Promissory estoppel is the primary basis for enforcement of donative
promises, but under Section 90(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
a charitable subscription may be "binding" even "without proof that the
promise induced action or forbearance."1 06 Instead, charitable subscriptions
may be enforceable so long as, in making the subscription, "the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee" and "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." 107
On its face, Section 90(2) is a potentially revolutionary expansion of
contract-the provision only requires a "probability of reliance," 08 and thus,

§ 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (explaining that promissory estoppel requires a
showing that it would be unjust to not enforce the promise).
102. See Dewein, 174 N.E.2d at 877.
103. See Ervin, 458 A.2d at 345.
104. Compare Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
a husband's promise to leave his wife property in exchange for caring for him during his
illness was not enforceable because the wife was already under a marital duty of support
(citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 242, 5100, 5132)), with Teason v. Miles, 118 N.W.2d 475 (Mich.
1962) (enforcing a mother's promise to leave her son a portion of her property in exchange for
living on her farm and taking care of her). For a critical discussion of whether Teason can be
distinguished on non-discriminatory grounds, see Fellows, supra note 80, at 341.
105. For a discussion of how contract law more broadly excludes historically
marginalized and disempowered groups, see generally Gan, supra note 55, at 79-103.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (Am. LAW INST. 1981).
107. Id. § 90(1)-(2).
108. Id. § 90 cmt. f.
CONTRACTS

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6
500

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 479

if expanded to donative promises more broadly, might include the caretaking
and indigent promisees that tend to be unable to enforce under a theory of
promissory estoppel.1 09 The Restatement's commentary on that provision,
0
however, suggests that Section 90(2) may actually be more conservative.o"
The comments to Section 90 note that Section 90(2) is grounded in longstanding public policy favoring charitable subscriptions."' The comments
also suggest that Section 90(2) is meant to replace the fiction of
consideration historically used to enforce charitable subscriptions. 112 To
date, only Iowa has expressly adopted Section 90(2). "1
Consequently, Restatement Section 90(2) leaves intact the general
principle that donative promises are usually not enforceable except under a
theory of promissory reliance.

In sum, under the donative promise principle, promises that induce the
promisee to change her position in some financially detrimental way may be
enforceable. Promises by donors to charitable institutions may also be
enforceable under the consideration doctrine. As a practical matter, this
leaves many of the donative promises made to caretakers and some of the
most indigent members of society unenforceable. For the remainder of this
Article, I discuss whether that should be so.

109. But see infra Section III.B.1.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (Am. LAW INST. 1981).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 90 cmt. f; see supra Section II.A.2.
113. See P.H.C.C., Inc. v. Johnston, 340 N.W.2d 774 (Iowa 1983) (citing Salsbury v.
Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1974) ("We believe public policy supports
[enforcing charitable subscriptions without proof of actual reliance]. It is more logical to bind
charitable subscriptions without requiring a showing of consideration or detrimental
reliance.")). For a case that has expressly rejected Section 90(2), see, for example, Arrowsmith
v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 545 A.2d 674, 685 (Md. 1988) ("[T]his Court [will] not
carve out an exception to the established law of contracts in order to give a privileged position
to promises made to charities. That is what Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(2) does.").
While New Jersey and New York have expressed support for a public policy in favor of
enforcing charitable subscriptions, neither state has adopted Restatement Section 90(2). See
Jewish Fed'n of Cent. N.J. v. Barondess, 560 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1989) (explaining that the "real
basis for enforcing a charitable subscription is one of public policy" and noting without
holding that charitable subscriptions may be "disguised as a contract" to effectuate that
policy); In re Field's Estate, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1958) (explaining that courts tend to enforce
charitable subscriptions because of the social value of the charitable institutions that depend on
such subscriptions).
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In this Part, I argue that the donative promise principle is an
inegalitarian principle. In Section A, I explain that making promissory
estoppel the primary basis for enforcing donative promises creates morally
and doctrinally perverse legal reasons to submit to improper promisor
influence. The donative promise principle is also inegalitarian with respect
to the promises it leaves outside of contract's reach. In Section B, I argue
that by leaving indigent and caretaking promises dependent on the whim of
promisors for meeting basic needs, the principle reifies power imbalances
between socially powerful promisors and historically disempowered
promisees.
A.

PerverseLegal Reasons to Succumb to ImproperInfluence

So far, I have been arguing that donative promises can induce promisees
to rely by empowering promisees to pursue freely chosen projects, but also
by offering a carrot to conform to promisor values or otherwise operating as
a vehicle for promisor influence.11 4 The promised good is often something
really important to the promisee. And even when it is not, the promise may
have been made in the context of a relationship of trust-such as family or
religion that leaves the promisee susceptible to manipulation or undue
pressure from the promisor." 5 A donee-promisee may therefore face
substantial pressure to rely on the donative promise because of her need for
the promised good or the character of her relationship with donorpromisors. 116 By making detrimental reliance the basis for enforcement,
promissory estoppel provides a new reason to rely: the acquisition of a
legally enforceable right to the performance of the gift promise.
In fact, the more the promisee relies by making substantial and costly
changes in her life, the greater the likelihood the promisee will secure a legal
right in the gift." 7 Although reliance may vest in the promisee a contractual
right in the performance of the promise, the court still retains the discretion
to reduce the promisee's remedy in accordance with the extent of her

114. See supra Section II.B.1.
115. See generally supra note 67 (discussing contract law's sensitivity to promisors'
potential emotional power over promisees).
116. See supra Section II.B.1.
117. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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reliance."' Even if expectation damages tend to be awarded more often than
a reliance measure of damages,11 9 the risk of being awarded merely the
value of detrimental reliance provides a further reason to engage in more
substantial and costly reliance.
And it is not enough for the promisee to detrimentally rely on the
promise; she must rely in a way that the promisor could have reasonably
foreseen.1 20 As Harvey and Ricketts suggest, reliance is often most
foreseeable when done in accordance with the promisor's communicated
purposes in making the promise. In Harvey, the parents encouraged the
plaintiff to build her home on the land;121 in Ricketts, the grandfather gave
the plaintiff the promissory note and encouraged her to quit her job.1 22
Consequently, promissory estoppel supplies legal reasons for the
promisee to conform to the promisor's hopes and expectations for the
promisee. In cases like Harvey, such reasons may be fairly innocuous, since
the promisors' hopes and expectations for the promisee are that the promisee
will succeed in her chosen projects. But in Ricketts-type cases, that
additional rational pressure exacerbates the promisor's power over the
promisee. If the plaintiff in Ricketts really did need the funds, she did well
under this regime to conform to her grandfather's conception of the good life
by quitting her job.1 23 The case may strike some of us as even more
troubling if we imagine the grandfather had promised her the funds to
encourage her to leave her lesbian lover 24 or convert to Christianity.1 25 In
such cases, having promissory estoppel as the sole basis for recovery creates
legal reasons for the promisee to leave her lover or change her religion, and
so foreseeably change her position in reliance on the grandfather's promise.
Of course, promissory estoppel does not preclude promisees from
resisting improper promisor influence or declining the promised gift. And

&

&

118. See id. at cmt. d (noting that "relief may sometimes be limited . . by the extent of
the promisee's reliance rather than by the terms of the promise").
119. See Stone & Stremitzer, supra note 17, at 4.
120. See supra Section II.B.1.
121. See Harvey v. Dow, 962 A.2d 322, 325-36 (Me. 2008).
122. See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 366 (Neb. 1898).
123. See id. at 366-67. Even though the plaintiff did not receive the support her
grandfather had hoped to give her during his lifetime, by quitting her job, the plaintiff secured
a portion of his estate. See id.
124. Cf MARCEL PROUST, SWANN'S WAY (C. K. Scott Moncrieff, trans., Barnes
Noble 2005) (1913); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Female World of Love and Ritual:
Relations Between Women in Nineteenth-Century America, 1 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE
Soc'y 1, 7 (1975).
125. See generally supra note 84 (describing some vulnerable Muslims' recent
conversion to Christianity for non-theological reasons, such as to receive aid, to assist in their
asylum applications, and other reasons).
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once the promisee detrimentally relies on the promise, the promisee may
thereby acquire a legal right to the performance and, hence, secure some
legal protection from any subsequent attempts by the promisor to pressure
the promisee to change her ways. The problem is not that promissory
estoppel leaves promisees powerless to resist improper influence. It is rather
that the law gives promisees reasons to conform to that influence. While not
all influence is morally problematic, 126 here the law perversely operates to
support people's use of promissory relationships as a means to convert their
greater wealth or special relationship of trust into greater authority over
another person's life.
Such reasons to rely are also in tension with doctrines of duress, undue
influence, and unconscionability, which serve to eliminate legal reasons to
perform promises that were improperly obtained.1 27 For example, if a
promise is induced by undue influence, any resulting contract is voidable by
the party improperly induced to make the promise.1 28 A promise is induced
by undue influence when the promisor is unfairly persuaded to make the
promise and the promisee is someone that the promisor is justified in
assuming "will not act in a manner inconsistent with the promisor's
welfare."1 29 Paradigmatic relationships that give rise to the potential for
undue influence include familial relationships and relationships between
clerics and parishioners. 3 0 The doctrine of undue influence thus aims to
relieve people from pressure to engage in courses of action induced through
an abuse of a special relationship of trust.
Not all forms of corrupt donor-promisor influence over donee-promisees
rise to the level of undue influence or duress. But by creating legal reasons
to conform to that influence, the donative promise principle empowers the
very kind of parties that the doctrine of undue influence aims to
disempower namely, parties who seek to abuse a relationship of trust
through the creation of a promissory relationship.
B. Reifying Social Inequality
Meanwhile, the donative promise principle tends to leave unenforceable
donative promises that are made to some of the most historically vulnerable

126. For example, parents might provide their children with a valuable moral education,
and friends may influence one another to be more open-minded through reasoned discussion
and shared experiences.
127. See supra notes 52-54.
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
129. See id.
130. See id. § 177 cmt. a.
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and marginalized groups of people-caretakers and indigent people.' 3
These are promisees who may have great need for the promised gifts but,
paradoxically, because their need is so severe (or their commitment to
caretaking so steady) are unlikely to be able to financially change their lives
in reliance on the donative promise. 3 2 Lacking a legal right to performance
of the promise, the promisor may revoke her promise for practically any
reason, and the promisee would have largely no lawful power to resist. 133
The need for the gift coupled with the absence of a right to performance
of the promise leaves promisees vulnerable to ongoing improper influence
by promisors. And not all problematic forms of conformity to improper
influence rise to the level of detrimental reliance. 114 A promisor may
encourage a promisee to adopt certain personality traits and moral
dispositions, such as conforming to social stereotypes of victimhoodl3 5 or
femininity,136

or undergoing religious

conversion.

37

These

forms of

influence may be no less life-changing than building a home or changing
employment.' 38 The donative promise principle thus leaves the very kind of
people to whom we want to distribute goods and empower susceptible to
manipulation and exploitation precisely because of their great financial need
or commitment to caretaking.
By holding that a donative promise is not enforceable when and because
the promisee has not financially relied on the promise, the donative promise
principle treats persons of financial means as having weightier interests than

131. See supra Section II.B.2.
132. See supra Section II.B.2.
133. Some equitable remedies may nonetheless be available, such as disgorgement for
unjust enrichment, but at the discretion of the court. See generally Kevin C. Kennedy,
Equitable Remedies andPrincipledDiscretion: The Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY
L. REv. 609 (1997) (discussing the historical development of courts' discretion to apply
equitable remedies).
134. See supra Section II.B.2.
135. See Phillips, supra note 86, at 1647.
136. Cf Fellows, supra note 80, at 337.
137. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Religious conversion may, however, rise
to the level of detrimental reliance if it is costly, such as when a church requires members to
regularly donate a nontrivial percentage of their income.
138. Even if these less tangible forms of reliance could ground a promissory estoppel
claim, the promisee may still be, for all practical purposes, in the same economic position she
would have been had the promise gone unenforced. Although expectancy damages are often
awarded in promissory estoppel cases, a court might elect to use a reliance measure of
damages. In cases of emotional or moral reliance, the economic value of reliance may be very
low or hard to measure. Hence, even if such intangible forms of reliance could ground a
promissory estoppel claim, the promisee may still be just as dependent on and vulnerable to
the promisor as the promisee was under a regime of nonenforcement. I am indebted to Nico
Cornell for these points.
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indigent persons in securing promised gifts. But why should a middle- or
upper-class promisee have a greater interest in a family plot of land than a
homeless person has in securing shelter (let alone a greater interest in being
protected from abuse arising from that interest)? The donative promise
principle thus seems to unfairly privilege wealthier persons.
At this point, it may be objected that the donative promise principle is
neutral as between the wealthy and indigent. What explains the failure to
enforce many promises to indigent persons and caretakers, one might argue,
is the difficulty of proving less tangible forms of moral and emotional
reliance.
In response, even if the premise about proof were true, the conclusion
does not follow. Donative promises could be enforced in the absence of
reliance, upon a finding that a donative promise was made, thus obviating
the need to inquire whether, for instance, a charitable organization pressured
recipients to act like victims or an ex-husband pressured his ex-wife to adopt
a more servile demeanor with him. It may of course sometimes be difficult
to show that a donative promise has been made, but that is also true
wherever proof that a promise has been made is sought, including cases of
reciprocal promising where consideration provides the ground for
enforcement. 139

Evaluated in the context of U.S. contract law more broadly, the donative
promise principle does not merely privilege the wealthy with respect to their
interests in gifts, but also with respect to their interests in securing basic
needs and in protection from abuse arising from those needs. Under the
consideration doctrine, a person can secure an immediately enforceable right
to medical services, food, home repair, and the like, if and when she has
promised to pay for them. Such a right insulates the promisee from pressure
to conform to attempts by the promisor to later attach additional conditions
on receiving such goods and services. While the promisor and promisee may
certainly agree to modify the terms of their arrangement,1 40 a promisor will
likely be in breach (or anticipatory breach) if she attempts to unilaterally
change the terms of their agreement. 141 For example, if a person's heater
breaks down during the winter, and she has hired someone to fix it, once a

139. See Kull, supra note 15, at 51-55.
140. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(explaining that parties may modify a contract not fully performed if, inter alia, "the
modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when
the contract was made").
141. See id. § 241 (outlining considerations for determining whether a failure to perform
some part of a contract is material, such as "the extent to which the injured party will be
deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected").
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price is fixed for the service the contractor cannot then lawfully use the
promisee's urgent need for heat to unilaterally raise the price or demand that
the promisee go out on a date with the contractor.1 42
In contrast, under the donative promise principle, if the contractor offers
to fix the heater for free, the promisee has neither a right to the urgently
needed repairs nor a right to be free from exploitation made possible by that
need and relationship of dependence. The donative promise principle, when
interpreted alongside the consideration doctrine, thus expresses and makes it
the case that if you cannot buy what you need, people may use promises to
meet that need to exploit you.1 43 The donative promise principle thus reifies
economic inequality by making access to promised goods and insulation
from attendant exploitation risks contingent on the promisee's wealth.
IV.

REMEDYING THE INEGALITARIAN DEFECTS OF THE DONATIVE PROMISE
PRINCIPLE

Under the donative promise principle, some donative promises are
contracts, but only if the promisee detrimentally relies on the promise.
Because promisees often have an urgent need for the promised gift or are in
a special relationship of trust with the promisor, donee-promisees tend to
systematically be vulnerable to a wide range of improper promisor influence.
By making promissory estoppel the primary basis for enforcement, the
donative promise principle thus creates perverse incentives to succumb to
improper promisor influence, reinforces the dependency of promisees who
are too poor or otherwise unable to rely, and reifies broader social inequality
by privileging wealthy promisees' interests in performance.
In this Part, I explore how a regime that made some donative promises
automatically enforceable upon being communicated to promisees would
remedy these defects in our extant doctrine. Such enforcement in the
absence of reliance is, of course, not the only alternative to promissory
estoppel. Donative promises might instead be enforced on a theory of
probable reliance, on the basis of the promisee's need for the promised gift,

142. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 33-34 (explaining that the consideration doctrine can be
deployed to deny enforcement to subsequent "bargains" that exploit a promisee's trust in the
original promise); cf U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977)
(explaining that parties may contract for the sale of a good even without settling on a price if,
inter alia, the price later fixed by the buyer or seller is fixed in good faith). Any such lastminute modifications acceded to out of a lack of reasonable alternatives may even constitute
duress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
143. Cf supra note 142.
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or perhaps under a default rule of enforcement.' 44 While I argue that simply
enforcing donative promises in the absence of reliance is more responsive
than these alternatives to the inegalitarian defects of the donative promise
principle, such an enforcement regime might still compromise other moral
and interpersonal values central to donative promising, such as trust and
authenticity. I develop and address these concerns in Part V and discuss an
important limit to enforcing donative promises-arising from the
heterogeneity of donative promises-in Part VI.
A.

Enforcing Donative Promises in the Absence ofReliance

Enforcing donative promises without requiring reliance could go a long
way to remedy the inegalitarian character of our extant contract law of
donative promises. In particular, if upon making a donative promise the
promisee had a contractual right to performance of that promise, the
promisee would be relieved of legal reasons to rely on the promise to secure
the promised gift (or a financial equivalent). Such an enforcement regime
could thereby counteract perverse legal reasons to succumb to promisor
attempts at improper influence.
Enforcement of unrelied-upon donative promises could also empower
indigent and caretaking promisees by redistributing legal power over
performance. Whereas under the donative promise principle the promisor
has the legal power to perform or not perform an unrelied-upon promise on a
whim, here the promisee would retain the power to demand or waive
performance (subject to doctrines excusing performance 145).
In turn, legal protection from risks of promisor exploitation arising from
dependency within the promissory relationship would no longer be
contingent on the promisee's wealth or ability to pay for the promised good
or service. Enforcing donative promises in the absence of reliance would
insulate the promisee from attempts by the promisor to later on attach
implicit conditions to the gift in ways that parallel the rights of commercial
contractors. Once A and B agree for A to fix B's heater for a fee, A cannot
then exploit B's urgent need for heat to extract an unreasonably high price
for the work.1 46 Similarly, were donative promises to be enforceable in the
absence of reliance, once the ex-husband promised his ex-wife to pay for his

144. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. As I hope will emerge later, I have rather
selected these alternatives because their benefits and limitations further illustrate the power
dynamics at work in donative promising and the value of using contract law to shape those
dynamics.
145. See infra Section IV.C.
146. See supra Section III.B.
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child's tuition, the ex-husband could not then later, on the day of enrollment,
use her financial need to reduce his contribution or otherwise take advantage
of her.1 47 Or at least, he retains no legal power to do so, unless he can show
that reasons to discharge his duty to perform apply. A donee-promisee could
also openly embrace different political or moral views than the promisor in
the knowledge that she has a legal right to the promised gift.1 48
By reshaping power dynamics within donative promissory relationships,
enforcement in the absence of reliance would also be valuable as a public
repudiation of the vulnerable status of donee-promisees. Such a reformed
contract law could thereby communicate that gift promises are not vehicles
for moral imperialism, and that the interests of indigent persons in fair
access to promised goods and services are just as valuable as the like
interests of the wealthy. The contractual right would also transform the
promised gift from a legally discretionary gratuityl49 into an entitlement to
which the promisee has public (and not just private moral) standing to
claim. 150
To be sure, a redistributive regime that depends largely on private
donations to provide for people's basic needs may produce the same
manipulation and hierarchy worries ex ante, prior to the making of any
particular donative promise (whether enforceable or not).' 51 ' Reforming the
donative promise principle is not a cure-all for social inequality. But while
we work on broader problems of social inequality, enforcing donative

147. Cf Ervin v. Ervin, 458 A.2d 342 (R.I. 1983).
148. Of course, it may be that promisees do not know that they have a contract right to
the gift, or may reasonably feel that they cannot access courts because of costs. Under such
circumstances, the motivational pressures to conform may be, for the promisee, no different
than before. Knowledge of legal rights and access to the legal system is, however, a much
larger problem.
149. Cf Elizabeth Wann, American Tipping is Rooted in Slavery-and it Still Hurts
Workers

Today,

FORD

FOUNDATION:

EQUALS

CHANGE

BLOG

(Feb.

18,

2016),

https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/american-tipping-is-rooted-inslavery-and-it-still-hurts-workers-today/ (linking tipping practices to slavery and racial
inequality).
150. Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (finding that welfare is an
entitlement, not a gratuity, the deprivation of which triggers a constitutional right to due
process).
151. Indeed, I think this is a strong reason to move away from large-scale reliance on
private donation and instead create and strengthen existing public redistributive schemes that
do not leave one class dependent on the good will of another (and also, that do not leave which
causes and needs deserve attention up to a few, but rather permit the people who actually need
the goods to have a say through the democratic process). See Reich, supra note 88 (discussing
how private foundations have "plutocratic elements" that pose a challenge for justifying
support for private foundations in a democratic society).
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promises in the absence of reliance could help remedy contract law's
complicity in perpetuating social inequality.
B. Alternatives
1.

ProbableReliance

Simply enforcing donative promises in the absence of reliance is not the
only alternative to promissory estoppel, nor is it the only way that donative
promises could be enforced without requiring promisee reliance. Two
features of promissory estoppel seem to produce the disempowering effects
discussed in Part III: the requirement to show actualreliance and promissory
estoppel's narrow conception of reliance itself. By requiring promisees to
actually rely in order to secure a legal right to the promise, promissory
estoppel provides promisees with legal reasons to rely on the promise, even
when doing so would involve succumbing to improper influence by the
promisor. 152 Further, by excluding less tangible but no less serious forms of
emotional reliance from the legal category of reliance, the donative promise
principle prevents promisees who may actually have the greatest need for the
promised gifts from enforcing donative promises.1 53
These defects might suggest that promissory estoppel should be revised
to require only probable reliance, rather than actual reliance. Under such a
theory, a donative promise would be enforceable if the promisor could
reasonably and foreseeably expect the promisee to rely on the promise, and
injustice can be avoided only if the promise is enforced. Such a proposal
would hence seek to expand Section 90(2) of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts beyond charitable subscriptions to donative promises more
broadly.1 54

Enforcement under a theory of probable reliance has the benefit of
drawing on two familiar sources of contract law the Restatement and
promissory estoppel itself.15 5 Commentators also argue that requiring
probable reliance may help to screen for seriously made promises. 156
But even granting these benefits, probable reliance is a poor alternative
because the very idea of reliance may still import the discriminatory features

152. See supra Section III.A.
153. See supra Section III.B.
154. See supra Section II.B.3.
155. But courts have been reluctant to adopt Section 90(2), even in the limited context of
charitable subscriptions. See supra Section II.B.3.
156. See, e.g., Yorio & Thel, supra note 94, at 113. For a critical discussion of Yorio and
Thel's proposal, see Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 852-65.
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that made promissory estoppel inadequate to begin with. For example, in
Dewein, the court not only found that the plaintiff did not rely on her
brother's donative promise; the court suggested that it would also be
unreasonable to suppose that the plaintiff would have stopped taking care of
their mother "in the time of [the mother's] greatest need . . . ."157 The
circumstances in virtue of which the plaintiff was unlikely to rely were thus
precisely what led the court to conclude that the plaintiff did not actually
rely. 158 The problem, then, seems to be with the very idea of reliance. A
theory of probable reliance would accordingly fall short of remedying the
inegalitarian features of extant doctrine.
2.

Need-Based Enforcement

In cases of inducement by improper influence, severe poverty, and
caretaking, the promisee's substantial need for the promised gift is often a
lever for manipulation and source of the promisee's dependency on the
promisor. Enforcing donative promises when and because the promise
supplies a substantial need for the promisee might thus have the potential to
counteract manipulation and dependency risks arising from a donative
promise.
In particular, a need-based theory of enforcement would shift the focus
of legal inquiry from the effects of the promise to the mechanism by which
the promise operates as a vehicle for improper influence and dependency.
Rather than focusing on the existence or potential for changed
circumstances-an imperfect and discriminatory proxy for promisee
dependence on the promised gift a need-based approach instead inquires
directly about the significance of the gift in the promisee's life. Would the
gift have enabled the promisee to take steps to exit poverty, to feed her
family, or to find stable work? Was the gift a necessary or critical means to
one of the promisee's ends? To what extent was she counting on the
promised gift?1 59 Substantial need thus provides more direct insight than

reliance-focused theories into the power dynamics of the relationship and,
hence, into the extent to which contract enforcement could counteract
improper influence in promissory relationships.1 60

157. Dewein v. Estate of Dewein, 174 N.E.2d 875, 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
15 8. Id.
159. It is not clear how the notion of need would need to be defined under this approach.
I discuss problems with objective and subject standards for need below.
160. Depending on the theory of enforcement, enforcement might also exacerbate that
risk, as the donative promise principle illustrates. As I argue in Part VI, enforcement might
also be improper in certain donative promises to provide services.
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Such a need-based theory of enforcement is nonetheless problematic, as
it is either underinclusive or arbitrarily favors people with many wants and
desires. First, there are two ways we might understand a substantial need.
"Need" might be understood objectively, in terms of basic goods and
services that humans generally require to live a decent life, such as adequate
nutrition and a place to call home. An objective notion of need, however,
would make a need-centered approach to enforcement underinclusive.
Promissory estoppel would continue to govern inducement by improper
influence cases where the promised good is something other than a basic
need, such as a family heirloom, a house,' 6 ' medical school tuition, and the
like. But just because something is not a basic need does not mean it cannot
be used as an inducement to conform to the promisor's wishes. The
promised good may figure centrally in the promisee's life plans-the
promisee may, for instance, really want to become a physician.
Consequently, a need-centered approach would fail to counteract legal
reasons for promisees to conform to improper promisor influence.
Alternatively, to accommodate these concerns, need might be
understood subjectively, in terms of the value to the particular promisee.
But, second, if that is the case, a need-centered theory of enforcement has
the peculiar consequence of giving people who have many wants
enforceable rights with respect to a broader range of donative promises than
people who happen to have fewer wants. Donative promises made to an
insatiable consumer would tend to more often be enforceable than donative
promises made to a philosophical Stoic. Such a need-based principle of
enforcement is thus arbitrary in its operation.
Further, a subjective need-based theory of enforcement suggests a quasicommercial view of donative promising. By making promisee-want the basis
for enforcement, a subjective need theory suggests that the contract law of
donative promising aims to get goods and services to promisees who want
them because those promisees want them. As I discuss in more detail in Part
V, people often make donative promises to express friendship, solidarity,
and other affective and moral values.1 62 A need-based theory's vision of
donative promising thus seems a poor fit with the purportedly affective and
moral character of donative promising.

161. As opposed to a home, which might well be a basic need but take the form of a
condo, mansion, and so forth. For a discussion of the moral significance of having a home, see
generally Christopher Essert, Property and Homelessness, 44 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 266
(2016).
162. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 848 (arguing that if enforcement commodified
donative promises, that would provide a reason not to enforce).
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Default Enforcement

Alternatively, donative promises could be enforceable under a default
rule of enforcement. Under such a proposal, promisors would have to
communicate a specific intention to the promisee to avoid legal enforcement
of the donative promise.1 63 In the absence of such an expressed intention, the
promise would be enforceable upon being communicated to the promisee.
A default rule of enforcement has the advantage of doing away with the
problematic categories of need and reliance that animate the alternatives to
simply making donative promises enforceable discussed thus far. Further,
one might worry that opting for a mandatory rule of enforceability in the
absence of reliance would leave many people and entities uncomfortable
making promises for fear of liability, and would accordingly reduce gift
promises. In contrast, by giving promisors control over whether their
promises are legally binding, a default rule may be less likely to reduce
donative promises.
In response, assuming, for the sake of argument, that these concerns
about mandatory enforceability are true, it is not clear that a default rule
would really change current donative promissory relationship dynamics.
Replacing the donative promise principle with a default rule of enforcement
would obviate perverse legal reasons to conform to improper promisor
influence, but the promisee's right to the promised gift would still be largely
(if not even more) in the hands of the promisor. And while some
interpersonal promisors may feel embarrassed to tell promisees that their
promises are not to be legally binding grandfathers might feel
uncomfortable promising a gift to a grandchild while at the same time saying
that the gift is not enforceable

64

-it

is less clear that charitable institutions

would have such qualms. Given the risks of liability and the ease of
disclaiming it, why wouldn't such institutions always contract around such a
default rule?

&

163. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977) (stating that
an implied warranty of merchantability will be implied unless the parties to an agreement for
sale of goods agree otherwise). Default rules often "fill gaps in incomplete contracts," unlike
the proposal here. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989). For an argument grounded in
party autonomy that default rules should be used more broadly, see HANOCH DAGAN
MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 109 (2017) (arguing that a concern
with party autonomy recommends default over mandatory rules for contracting, except, inter
alia, in cases where mandatory rules are needed to "vindicate contract law's commitment to
relational equality").
164. I am indebted to Hanoch Dagan for this point.
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These points are, to be sure, empirically speculative. But they point to
an important moral limit of a default rule: either the rule will simply put
performance in the hands of the more powerful party (thus replicating
inegalitarian features of the donative promise principle), or the rule will
effectuate enforcement by means of shame and embarrassment. Even if the
latter mechanism turns out to be effective, in practice it leaves the promisee
dependent on the particular moral sensibilities of the promisor for public
recognition of the promisee's right to performance. A default rule will thus
either fail to cure the larger social inequality perpetuated by the donative
promise principle or will fail to cure the relational inequality between doneepromisees and promisors. Given the equality values at stake, a default rule is
therefore less attractive than mandatory enforceability.1 65
C. Implementation and Scope
Reducing donative promising is also not necessarily a regrettable
consequence of enforcing donative promises. If making donative promises
enforceable in the absence of reliance would lead people and entities to
make only or mostly sincere donative promises, that reform would have
succeeded in lessening the risk that donative promises will function as
vehicles for improper influence over promisees. A sincerer donative
promising practice could also support larger patterns of trust that enable
promising to flourish. Of course, it may still be true that fewer people will
receive needed goods and services. But that result should prompt us to adopt
more robust redistributive policies rather than continue to have a contract
law that gives such people reasons to conform to the expectations and mores
of more powerful social classes.
Some of the seeming harshness of enforcement in the absence of
reliance might also be lessened by tailoring doctrines that excuse
performance to the morality of donative promising. Doctrines excusing
performance are traditionally quite narrow. For example, to show that
performance has been made impracticable by an unexpected and
supervening event, the nonoccurrence of the event must be a basic (though
not necessarily express) assumption of the contract,1 66 and the event must
make performance unreasonably difficult, expensive, or injurious.1 67 if a
person's home burns down, she may still have to pay her credit card bills.

165. Cf DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 163, at 109 (arguing that mandatory rules may be
better suited to vindicating social and relational equality).
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
167. See id. at cmt. c.
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But if your grandparents' home bums down, it may be unreasonable if
not objectionable to insist that they continue paying for your tuition, even if
paying would not leave them unable to care for themselves or they should
have insured themselves for the risk. 168 Were doctrines excusing
performance to apply here as narrowly as they do in commercial settings,
promisors might reasonably feel uncomfortable promising gifts and
accordingly make fewer gift promises. Ensuring that expanded enforcement
of donative promises does not unduly shrink our donative promising practice
may therefore require tailoring doctrines excusing performance to the
reasonable expectations of promisors and promisees regarding improvidence
and other moral aspects of donative relationships, such as ingratitude.1 69
To be sure, it seems undesirable that courts should, at least in theory, be
able to inquire into every reason for not keeping a donative promise. For
example, it seems overly intrusive for courts to determine whether your
friend's decision to stay in to rest after a long day of work was compelling
enough to excuse her from having to bring a dish to your potluck.
In response, as a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that friends would
sue friends and acquaintances over quotidian matters such as failing to bring
dishes to potlucks. Such litigation would be extremely costly in proportion
to the value of the promised help. Moreover, the considerations that I have
argued supporting enforcement will often not extend to such cases. It is, for
instance, not at all clear that merely by promising to bring a casserole to
your party that I can induce you to mold some significant aspect of your life
to my ends. In arguing that enforcing donative promises could remedy
inegalitarian defects in our current legal regime, I am thus not arguing that
all donative promises should be enforceable.
It may admittedly be difficult to draw a line between these quotidian and
innocuous kinds of donative promises and other donative promises that
recommend enforcement on egalitarian grounds. As I discuss in Part VI,
should we move towards a legal regime that enforced donative promises in
the absence of reliance, enforcement would need to be calibrated to the
heterogeneity of donative promises. But even if such issues of scope can
ultimately be resolved, enforcement will be morally problematic if
enforcement would compromise the moral values of donative promises.
Thus, before further exploring matters of implementation and scope, I will
now turn to enforcement's influence over the cooperation, trust, and

168. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 5-6.
169. For a general overview of how the civil law treats improvidence and ingratitude, see
Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 13-15.
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authenticity that support donative promises and donative practices more
broadly.
V.

SUPPORTING THE MORAL VALUES OF DONATIVE PROMISES

Many of the donative promises I have discussed thus far are morally
defective, either because the promisor covertly intends the promise to
operate as a vehicle for improper influence or because there is a serious risk
that the promise will be so perceived. But donative promises are, of course,
not all nefarious. Donative promises play valuable roles in sustaining
interpersonal relationships and moral communities. The promises can
reinforce shared projects and facilitate forms of social cooperation that
might not otherwise come about through preexisting social and economic
arrangements. By promising to pay for a sister's rent while she takes care of
an elderly family member, a sibling can communicate love, gratitude, and
long-term commitment to both family members.1 70 Such a promise can also
express shared values that the work both siblings perform is equally
important, even if the market treats them differently. By expressing such
commitment and values, a joint undertaking between equals can grow from
the promise.
Similarly, by promising to contribute funds for a public park, a
neighborhood association can bring a community together and enable
members of that community to communicate to one another their shared
responsibility for creating healthy public spaces. A grandparent's promise to
pay for her grandson's college fees can likewise express love and
commitment, while also communicating to her children that they are not
alone in endeavoring to provide for their child's future.' 7 1 Meanwhile, a
foundation's promise to provide vaccines for an indigent community can
direct resources to people who need them most. A society's donative
promising practice can thus create and reinforce civic and intimate
relationships of equality and facilitate freely undertaken social cooperation.
The moral values of our donative practices suggest that however we
respond to the inegalitarian character of the donative promise principle, it

170. Cf Dewein v. Estate of Dewein, 174 N.E.2d 875, 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961) ("Sis, I
am so grateful you are taking care of mother, and I am certainly going to see you are taken
care of for life, you deserve it.").
171. Cf Ervin v. Ervin, 458 A.2d 342, 343 (R.I. 1983) ("[Y]ou have nothing to be
concerned about as to Michael's being able to attend college, even if I have to borrow the
money."); Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94 (N.Y. 1919) (explaining that an aunt's
promissory note of $3,000 to her nephew was made because "she loved him very much" and
wanted to take care of him).
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should be in such a way that leaves ample room for such values to flourish.
In this Part, I argue that making a wide range of donative promises of goods
and services to persons and nonprofit organizations enforceable, even in the
absence of reliance, could support the moral values of our donative
practices. 172 In Section A, I discuss and reject one prominent objection to
enforcing donative promises, according to which enforcement would
undermine the donative character of the promised gift. I then argue in
Sections B and C that enforcement in the absence of reliance could actually
enhance the authenticity of donative promissory relationships and the trust
upon which they depend.
A.

Enforcement Need Not Obscure the Motives ofDonative Promisors

Even if enforcing donative promises in the absence of reliance could
resolve the inegalitarian features of our current contact law of donative
promises, 73 one might worry that such a reform would alter and taint the
promises' donative character.1 74 A common moral objection to
contractualizing donative promises is that the threat of legal enforcement
would obscure promisors' motives for performing.' 7 5 Melvin Eisenberg, for
instance, argues that if donative promises were contracts, "it could never be
clear to the promisee, or even to the promisor, whether a donative promise
that was made in spirit of love, friendship, affection, or the like, was also

172. I hence do not discuss whether promises made from an affective or moral motive to
for-profit entities should be enforceable in the absence of consideration and reliance. A
promise to, for example, forebear from suing such-and-such airline in gratitude for their
smooth handling of an otherwise actionable series of events does not seem central to our
donative practices. Further, enforcement of such promises would potentially alter power
dynamics between consumers and for-profit entities and a discussion of such power dynamics
is beyond the scope of this Article.
173. See supra Section IVA.
174. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 848.
175. See id. Aditi Bagchi and Dori Kimel advance a similar thesis but as applied to
donative interpersonal promises in particular. See DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO
CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 76 (2003) (arguing that the
prospect of contract enforcement makes it difficult for a promisee to know and thereby trust a
promisor's motives for performance, and hence, that contract is a "singularly inadequate arena
for revealing character traits and expressing attitudes of the kind of which personal
relationships thrive"); Bagchi, supra note 95, at 710, 716 (arguing that contract should not
extend to "private" or "everyday" promises because "[t]he moral character of a private
promise depends on the fact that it is not only freely made but also freely kept," and that the
prospect of contract enforcement would undermine the "voluntary character" of performance).
So although this Article expressly addresses Eisenberg's arguments for the donative promises
principle (since that is also his express focus), most of my arguments in response to Eisenberg
should also be responsive to Bagchi's and Kimel's positions.
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performed for those reasons, or instead was performed to discharge a legal
obligation or avoid a lawsuit."1 76 Making donative promises enforceable in
the absence of reliance would thus interfere with the communicative
function of the promises and thereby undermine their potential to create and
support a variety of intimate and civil associations.
Although I ultimately argue that contractualizing all donative promises
may undermine the value of an important subset of those promises (namely
promises to volunteer), Eisenberg's worry about enforcement may be
misplaced.
First, I doubt that contract enforcement would obscure-from either the
promisor's or the promisee's point of view the motive of performance. 177
Criminal and family law contexts are instructive.17 When you stop your car
at a crosswalk while I pass, it seems plausible to me that your stopping is
principally motivated by your moral sense (you believe pointless injury is
wrong, that your desire to get to the store before it closes does not trump my
interests in physical integrity), rather than by the steep criminal penalties
you might face should you decide to mow me down.1 79 Indeed, I suspect that
if we could not regularly understand one another as being so motivated not
just to stop at crosswalks, but to comply with much of criminal and tort
law it would be a rare sight to see people crossing the street, let alone
outside of their homes. Likewise, I doubt that many parents are confused
about their motives when they feed and clothe their children, even though
they have much to lose should they fail to comply with child neglect laws. 8 0

176. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 848.
177. For an analysis and rejection of the various ways commentators, such as Eisenberg,
feel that enforcement may affect the motive of a donative promisor (and the way that motive is
perceived by the promisee), see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Is a Contracta Promise?, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 253-55 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
178. See Shiffrin, supra note 177, at 253.
179. It may be that Eisenberg is making the empirical claim that enforcement would
displace or "crowd out" donative motives. As much may be suggested by Eisenberg's remark
that, were donative promises to be enforced in the absence of reliance, "the promisor's motives
[to perform] would invariably be mixed." Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 848. Since Eisenberg
does not offer empirical support for the claim of displacement, I interpret Eisenberg to be
instead claiming that enforcement would leave promisors and promisees confused about the
communicative content of the promise and motivations for giving the gift.
180. To be sure, the bar is quite high for terminating parental rights on grounds of
neglect. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982) (holding that, in state neglect
proceedings, in order to terminate parental rights, the state must support its claims with at least
clear and convincing evidence and that a preponderance of the evidence standard violates due
process). Even so, a divorced or single parent who fails to comply with child neglect laws may
easily lose custody of her child, as a majority of U.S. states permit modification of custody
orders if modification would be in the "best interests of the child." See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-10-129 (West 2014).
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Why, then, would the threat of contract enforcement which is standardly
understood not to be punitive'-leave a donative promisor's motives
unclear when she makes the gift? 182
In Eisenberg's defense, there is, however, perhaps another way to
understand his concern that enforcement would undermine the donative
character of the promises. Eisenberg suggests that donative promises are
donative precisely because their performance is not required:
We use gifts to indicate our favorites-if we choose to withdraw
our affections, then we should not be forced into making the
transfer nevertheless. The forced transfer is no longer an indication
of our feelings .

. .

. The enforcement (against the will of the giver)

of a gift removes all characteristics of its "gift-ness" except the
transfer of the ownership.1 83
I agree that if a donative promise were actually enforced, we would be
hard-pressed to call the court-ordered transfer a gift. But I disagree that the
risk of enforcement would taint donative promises and their unenforced
performance. And that is because I disagree with Eisenberg that the
performance is not required in the first place. 184
After making a promise, it is generally no longer, as a moral matter,
within the promisor's discretion whether to perform. 185 Indeed it would be
hard to understand the promisor as having made any kind of promise if she

181. I do not mean to take a stand on whether contract remedies are or should be punitive
and on the related issue of whether penalty clauses should be enforceable. Compare Lake
River Corp. v. Carbonmdum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that penalty
clauses in contracts should be enforceable in light of economic benefits of parties being able to
signal their credibility by agreeing to such clauses, and that "refusal to enforce penalty clauses
is (at best) paternalistic"), with Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608
N.E.2d 975, 984 (Ind. 1993) ("We hold that in order to recover punitive damages in a lawsuit
founded upon a breach of contract, the plaintiff must plead and prove the existence of an
independent tort of the kind for which Indiana law recognizes that punitive damages may be
awarded.").
182. If the promisee were truly concerned about the motive of the promisor, she could
just waive performance and see what happens. See Shiffrin, supra note 177, at 252-54.
183. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 848 (quoting Thomas Mayhew, Discussion Questions
for Seminar in Contracts Theory (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)).
184. Not to mention, I think it is a morally unattractive view to treat donative promises as
discretionary for the dependency and gratuity reasons discussed earlier. See supra Part III.
185. "By promising we put in another man's hands a new power to accomplish his will,
though only a moral power: What he sought to do alone he may now expect to do with our
promised help, and to give him this new facility was our very purpose in promising. By
promising we transform a choice that was morally neutral into one that was morally
compelled." FRIED, supra note 1, at 8.
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communicated to the promisee that she might change her mind on a
whim.' 8 6 By making a promise, the donative promisor makes a commitment
to the promisee; in the absence of circumstances excusing performance,1 7 it
is up to the promisee to release the promisor and not for the promisor to
decide whether to perform.'I" If the promisor had instead not wanted to be
so bound, she could have simply not announced her intention to the
promisee, and then waited until she felt like performing to perform. The fact
that contractualizing donative promises would render their performance
required therefore need not undermine the "gift-ness" of donative
performance, since the performance may already be morally required.
Meanwhile, by voluntarily making a promise of a gift, a person could still
indicate her "favorites" or communicate her affections.
Nor do I think we should worry about the cases where the promise is
actually enforced. In such cases, it is largely irrelevant that the transfer after
litigation is not a gift. The relationship has already gone bad, the promisor
having failed to remain faithful to her promise. And so enforcing the
promise should not confuse the parties as to whether the court-ordered
transfer expressed friendship, love, or the like.
B. Authenticity
Contrary to Eisenberg's worries, contractualizing donative promises
may actually serve to clarify that a donative promisor's motive is genuinely
donative. Consider a teenager whose grandfather promises to pay for her
college tuition. She really needs the funds but also knows that her
grandfather disapproves of her taste in clothing and her political views and
has been vocal about his disapproval in the past. In the absence of a
contractual right to the promised funds, she may reasonably worry whether
her grandfather made the promise out of love and respect or out of a desire
to get her to change her ways. But by having a contractual right to the funds,
she may feel more secure in her belief that the promise was made out of love
and respect. Since she has a right to the funds regardless of whether she
conforms to her grandfather's moral precepts, she has an additional (and
clarifying) reason to believe he did not mean the promise as a carrot for

186. And if the promisor kept this plan to herself, we might well charge her with being
deceptive.
187. See supra Section IV.C.
188. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and
Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 506-07 (2008) (explaining that in making a promise to
A, B has waived her right to decide whether to perform purely on the merits and instead has
transferred that power to A by promising).
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inducing conformity. In turn, the contract right can enable the grandfather to
more clearly communicate his aims in making the promise.
The contractual right may also help to clarify the granddaughter's
motives towards her grandfather more generally. In the absence of the right,
after he makes the promise, if his granddaughter's attentiveness to his needs
starts to increase, he may entertain doubts as to whether her attentiveness
was motivated by love or by a desire to stay in his good graces. If she has to
wait many years for the funds (suppose she has to delay applying to college
for some unrelated reason), she may start to question her own motives
towards her grandfather, especially if she really does deplore his political
views.
But if the granddaughter has a legal right to the funds, and she and her
grandfather know this, then that right and shared knowledge give the
grandfather a further and clarifying reason (in addition to the reasons based
on their relationship prior to the promise) to believe she may be acting in a
genuinely loving way she need not remain in his good favors to receive the
help, and they both know that. Hence, contractualizing the grandfather's
promise may not only help to clarify his motives but can also mitigate the
threat that the donative promise poses to the larger authenticity of their
relationship. 8 9 Contractualizing at least some donative promises, like the
grandfather's promise, should therefore be something that commentators like
Eisenberg welcome. 190

C.

Trust

So far I have been arguing that making donative promises enforceable in
the absence of reliance could remedy inegalitarian features of extant contract
law and enhance the authenticity of donative promissory relationships.
Before turning to limitations of my proposal in Part VI, I want to briefly
highlight two further arguments in favor of enforcing donative promises:

189. If the grandfather wants the promised tuition to encourage the granddaughter to
change her ways, then contract might encourage him to say so. To be sure, he might still be
using his money to push her around, but at least now he is being honest. And that honesty is a
good thing for the promising practice and a good thing for their relationship. The
granddaughter now has no illusions about what he is about, and she can make an informed
decision on where to take their relationship next.
190. Of course, contract enforcement would likely constrain people's ability to use gift
promises to express favoritism, since promisors could not simply revoke their promise if the
promisee falls out of favor (or if a more favored potential promisee comes on the scene). But it
is not clear why that is a power the law should leave intact. Deploying gift promises to such
ends feels manipulative, especially when the promised performance is something that actually
matters to the promisee, as the college funds example suggests.
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that nonenforcement creates strategic reasons to rely that have a potentially
corrosive effect on trust, and that enforcement would mitigate rational
pressure to create contingency plans.
1.

StrategicReliance

Rebecca Stone and Alexander Stremitzer argue that in the absence of a
legal regime enforcing promises, the promisee will tend to overinvest in
reliance on the promise.191 A promisor's motivation to keep her promise
tends to increase the more a promisee relies on the promise 92 the promisor
may feel particularly guilty for breaking relied-upon promises or may
"simply believe[] that it is a graver moral wrong to break a promise that has
been relied upon more."' 93 Anticipating this phenomenon, promisees
"strategicallyrely on promises in order to make their promisors more likely
to keep their promises."' 94 Promisees thus tend to overinvest in reliance on
promises in the absence of legal enforcement. 195
In contrast, overinvestment should drop in a legal regime that enforces
promises. 196 Now that the promise is enforceable, there is "no need to
overinvest in order to increase ... guilt from breaking a promise, because
the legal regime ensures that a [promisor] has a sufficient self-interested
reason to keep her promise, so long as the [promisee] invests . . . ." 197
Although Stone and Stremitzer's study is not about donative promises in
particular, their findings may still be probative.1 98 First, donative promising
is already a morally laden practice. 199 It seems plausible that promisees
might anticipate that their grandfathers, 200 parents, 20' brothers, 202 spouses

191. See Stone & Stremitzer, supra note 17, at 3-4 (arguing that in the absence of legal
enforcement of an expectancy interest in the promise, the promisee may overinvest to
psychologically "lock in" the promisor).
192. See id. at 44 ("Our results suggest that, even in the absence of a legal regime that
enforces relied upon promises, a promisee's reliance on a promise makes the promisor more
likely to keep it.").
193. Id. at 8 n.6.
194. Id at 44.
195. Id at 3-4.
196. Id
197. Id. at 36-37. In this passage, Stone and Stremitzer are discussing the particular
dictator game that supports their findings.
198. For a discussion of the extent to which Stone and Stremitzer's findings may apply
"outside the laboratory," see id. at 46-47.
199. Cf id at 8 n.6, 14, 47.
200. Cf Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
201. Cf Harvey v. Dow, 962 A.2d 322 (Me. 2008).
202. Cf Dewein v. Estate ofDewein, 174 N.E.2d 875, 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
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and ex-spouses,203 and foundations might be morally motivated to keep their
relied-upon promises and accordingly overinvest. 204
Second, even though Stone and Stremitzer's study focuses on
enforcement of relied-upon promises, 205 their study may still lend support to
enforcing donative promises in the absence of reliance. Stone and Stremitzer
contend that strategic reasons to rely can be obviated by enforcing reliedupon promises because such enforcement gives a promisor "a self-interested
reason to keep her promise . . . ."206 Such a self-interested reason is also
given by a regime that makes a donative promise enforceable when made.
Enforcing donative promises in the absence of reliance should therefore also
obviate strategic reasons for donee-promisees to over-rely.
To the extent that Stone and Stremitzer's study applies to donative
promising, their study suggests that enforcing donative promises could
support the cooperative character of donative promises and mitigate forms of
promisee manipulation of promisors. In the context of a donative promise,
relying to get the promisor to perform out of guilt seems disingenuous, an
attempt to manipulate fidelity by playing with the promisor's emotions. If
the promisor discovered the promisee's motives for overinvesting, the
promisor might reasonably feel betrayed in her discovery that the promisee
did not trust that the promisor would perform.
Further, if the promisee can anticipate that the promisor will experience
psychological lock-in the more the promisee relies, then it is not too far off
to imagine that promisors might also anticipate that promisees will
strategically rely. Strategic reasons to overinvest might thus perpetuate
distrust. And in the cases where the promisee really does trust the promisor,
the reasons the promisor has to distrust the promisee may leave the promisor
confused about the promisee's motives. The strategic reasons that create
distrust in the absence of enforcement may therefore corrupt even the most
well-intentioned donative promise.
Similar concerns apply even in the regime in which Stone and
Stremitzer recommend for obviating strategic reasons to overinvest, namely
a regime that enforces promises under a theory of promissory estoppel. 207
Promissory estoppel gives promisees reasons to rely by investing in and
thereby detrimentally relying on the promise, and hence, securing a right to

203. Cf Ervin v. Ervin, 458 A.2d 342 (R.I. 1983).
204. Indeed, the court in Ricketts suggests that the grandfather felt guilty towards the end
of his life for not having been able to pay out the full amount of the promissory note. See
Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
205. Stone & Stremitzer, supra note 17, at 4.
206. See id. at 36-37.
207. See id. at 4.
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enforcement. It seems at odds with the purportedly cooperative character of
donative promises that a person would rely to secure a right to performance
of the promise. The promisee should feel free to build the home on her
parents' land because it is her dream, 208 and not because she wants to lock in
a remedy. The promisee should be encouraged to rely on the donative
promise in a way that treats the promisor as a partner, not as a potential
adversary. Enforcing donative promises even when not relied-upon can thus
not only obviate strategic reasons to over-rely, but also obviate strategic
reasons to rely in the first place. Enforcing donative promises in the absence
of reliance can thereby support promissory trust and the cooperative
character that our donative practices purport to have.
2.

Contingency Plans

In addition to producing strategic reasons to invest, nonenforcement also
produces reasons to create backup plans in the event that the promisor does
not make the gift. Similar to strategic reasons to invest, backup plans may
evince distrust, especially in a close personal relationship between a
promisor and a promisee.
Suppose, for instance, the granddaughter in Ricketts, after having
accepted her grandfather's promise, contacted her previous employer to
develop a plan to return to work if the grandfather did not soon make good
on his promise. On the one hand, creating such contingency plans seems
perfectly reasonable in a legal regime where donative promises are not
enforced. In hoping that the granddaughter would rely on his promise, the
grandfather was asking his granddaughter to take on a substantial financial
risk (especially since, in hindsight, we know that he did not actually have the
promised funds). It might even be irresponsible for her not to make any
contingency plans.
On the other hand, making such plans may reasonably be understood by
the promisor as evincing distrust. To see why, now suppose that the
grandfather discovers that she has made such contingency plans. He might
reasonably feel betrayed, since such plans give him a reason to believe she
does not trust him. He might also feel that he was deceived if she kept her
plans secret. The granddaughter's affections for her grandfather may in turn
give her reasons to not make contingency plans, as she may not want to act
in ways that could hurt him emotionally. (Or, alternatively, fearing that he

208. Cf Harvey v. Dow, 962 A.2d 322, 323 (Me. 2008) ("From the time they were
young, Teresa and her brother talked about the houses they would eventually like to build on
the homestead; Teresa said she wanted her home to be located near a spring, close to where it
now sits.").
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would be hurt if he discovered her plans, she might affirmatively try to hide
them from him.)
The reasons that nonenforcement gives a promisee to make contingency
plans may thus exert a corrosive influence on trust. Nonenforcement also
places the promisee in a bind: either she must expose herself financially or
engage in behavior that might reasonably be experienced as distrustful or
even deceptive.
Enforcement can lessen some of the rational pressure to make
contingency plans. If the promise is enforceable, the remedy available
through enforcement provides the promisee with a default contingency
plan. 209 The promisee need not feel as much pressure to plan for the worst
because she already has a legal right that can offer her some protection in the
event that the promisor breaches her trust.
To be sure, an important aspect of trusting and caring for someone
involves a willingness to make oneself vulnerable to that person. 210 The law
should not seek to eliminate all vulnerability in donative promises and
should probably leave ample room for people to experience the vulnerability
that may be so central to caring for others. 2 11 But enforcement of donative
promises in the absence of reliance would not eliminate emotional
vulnerability. For example, even if the son in Ervin had been able to secure a
contract right to the tuition promised by his father, 212 it seems entirely
plausible that he still would have been hurt when his father decided not to
help.

209. Community property law and spousal support default rules may play a similar role
in supporting trust and intimacy in marital promises. By providing a default division of
property upon divorce, family law can lessen the need to make contingency plans. Discussing
contingency plans while planning to get married and thus imagining who gets what should the
marriage not work out may be particularly emotionally painful for some people. Planning
together for such contingencies after getting married may likewise be painful, while making
such plans on the side may lead a spouse who discovers such plans to feel that divorce is on
the horizon.
210. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, EQUALITY AND TRADITION: QUESTIONS OF VALUE IN
MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 22-24 (2010) (arguing that valuing a relationship or a
person-such as a friendship or a family member constitutively involves making oneself
emotionally vulnerable to that relationship or person). I am indebted to Jorah Dannenberg for
drawing my attention to the importance of leaving room for vulnerability.
211. Cf Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contractand Promise, 120 HARV.
L. REv. 708, 715 (2007) (arguing that, although the law should not enforce morality as such, it
should make room for moral agency to flourish).
212. The son would have to prevail on a third-party beneficiary theory since the promise
was made to his mother.
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VI. TOWARD A CONTRACT LAW FOR DONATIVE PROMISES

Enforcing donative promises in the absence of reliance can make for a
more egalitarian contract law and support moral values that sustain donative
promising, such as trust and sincerity. In advancing these positions, I have
been relying on two more basic moral principles: that the law should not
facilitate social inequality and that the law should support the flourishing of
interpersonal and broader social relationships. As the defects in the donative
promise principle illustrate, the first principle requires taking a close look at
how the law creates power and status through both its remedial functions
and what the law publicly communicates about the people and relationships
it regulates.
Meanwhile, ensuring that the law is compatible with a social
environment supportive of interpersonal and broader social cooperation may
require doctrinal sensitivity to different values depending on the particular
social domain under regulation. The case of donative promising illustrates
that even if doctrines of consideration and promissory estoppel may be wellsuited to commercial relationships, we should not assume that those
doctrines are a good fit for donative relationships, which may require
different forms of social support to flourish. For example, as I have been
arguing, enforcement of donative promises in the absence of reliance is
needed to remedy inegalitarian defects in our contract law of donative
promises.
A similar, but often overlooked, point should be made about donative
relationships themselves: donative promises are not homogeneous. Gift
giving occurs within a variety of cooperative settings that may be
characterized by different power dynamics and animated by different moral
values, some of which may be ill-served by certain contract principles. Just
as contract should attend to differences in power, status, and values between
commercial and donative settings, so contract should also attend to
differences within donative practices. To illustrate this point, before closing
I briefly discuss the underexamined case of volunteer work. While I do not
hold that contract is poorly suited to donative promises generally, volunteer
work may actually be a paradigm case of donative practices that should be
kept outside "the world of contract."

213

213. Volunteers are exempted from federal minimum wage law. See Tony & Susan
Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985) (explaining that a federal wage and
hour statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012),
does not reach "ordinary voluntarism").
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Volunteer Work and the Heterogeneity ofDonative Promises
1.

Promisee Power

Commitments to volunteer at an organization are often not characterized
by the power imbalances that recommend enforcing unrelied-upon promises
elsewhere. Unlike the individual promisee, the institutional or organizational
promisee may be much more powerful than the volunteer-promisorconsider the Peace Corps, the Red Cross, or the White House relative to a
student volunteer. In such cases, the volunteer-promisor's legal right to later
withhold her labor may not enable her to exercise any influence over the
organization. 2 14 The organization may, for instance, have a long list of
potential volunteers ready to jump in should the promisor drop out.
Indeed, if volunteering is important to the promisor's pursuit of
employment, the power imbalance may be the reverse of that between a
person promised a temporary food supply and a wealthy donor-promisor.
The volunteer-promisor may feel that she needs to do the unpaid work (and
secure favorable references) to have a suitable CV for her public policy
Ph.D. application or her job application to the Gates Foundation. 215 That
vulnerability is compounded by the fact that volunteers may not be protected
by antidiscrimination law. 216 Hence, in cases of commitments to volunteer,

214. Volunteers are also typically not employees for purposes of the federal right to
engage in protected "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection." National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (describing
the "right of employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc."); see WBAI Pacifica
Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999) (finding that volunteers at a radio station were not
NLRA employees because their relationship to the station had "no economic aspect" as "[t]hey
receive no wages or fringe benefits," and, "[t]o the contrary, they often raise[d] money or
contribute money to the station").
215. See David L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student
Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227 (1998); Mitchell H. Rubinstein,
Our Nation's Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147
(2006).
216. Volunteers are generally not covered by federal antidiscrimination law. See, e.g.,
Juino v. Livingston Par. Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013) ("[A] volunteer is
generally not an "employee," and thus no "hire" has occurred since there is no receipt of
remuneration supporting an employer-employee relationship."); O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d
112, 113-14, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a volunteer at a psychiatric hospital, whose
supervisor suggested that she join in an orgy and called her "Miss Sexual Harassment," was
not an employee for purposes of Title VII). For an argument that volunteers should be
protected by Title VII, see generally Tara Kpere-Daibo, Note, Unpaid and Unprotected:
Protecting Our Nation's Volunteers Through Title VII, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 135
(2009) (arguing that Title VII should be amended to extend to volunteers at nonprofits and forprofits alike).
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the power imbalance created by the donative promise is often negligible, if
not decidedly in favor of the organizational promisee. Imposing a
contractual duty to perform the volunteer work may therefore tip the power
balance even further in favor of the promisee, leaving the promisor
vulnerable to abuse and manipulation by the organization to which she has
committed to volunteer. 217

And thus, remedying the inegalitarian character of certain voluntary
positions may require a legislative solution. For instance, we might need to
legislate that competitive voluntary positions be paid a minimum wage or
protected by antidiscrimination law.
2.

Inclusivity and Liabilityfor Defects in Performance

Contract principles governing performance may also be at odds with
moral values of the volunteering practice itself. Although many volunteers
perform work similar to paid workers, volunteer work can also be a context
for distinctively inclusive work. 218 Consider community gardening,
neighborhood event planning, or setting up for a political rally. These are
forms of volunteering that are not necessarily about providing a good for
some recipient or market, but rather about other values, such as political
activism, religiosity, or community membership. Once a certain threshold of
ability is met, volunteers are often selected on the basis of nonmeritocratic

&

217. Such a power imbalance in the context of quasi-market work raises an issue as to
whether such "volunteer" positions should be lawful. Progress on this issue is unlikely, though,
so long as we continue to conceptualize such positions as volunteer positions. Cf Tony
Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 294, 302 (1985) (explaining the wage and
hour provisions of FLSA do not reach "ordinary voluntarism" and that FLSA was "obviously
not intended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or implied
compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage") (quoting Walling v. Portland
Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)); Volunteers, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://webapps.d
ol.gov/elaws/whd/flsa/docs/volunteers.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2017) ("The Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) defines employment very broadly, i.e., 'to suffer or permit to work.'
However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the FLSA was not intended 'to stamp all
persons as employees who without any express or implied compensation agreement might
work for their own advantage on the premises of another.' In administering the FLSA, the
Department of Labor follows this judicial guidance in the case of individuals serving as unpaid
volunteers in various community services."). Litigation efforts have instead been focused on
unpaid internships in the for-profit private sector. See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures,
Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536 (2nd Cir. 2016) (expressly rejecting the Department of Labor's
suggested approach in favor of an intern-specific test for determining whether the intern is "the
primary beneficiary" of the internship); Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F.
App'x 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that student externs who "engage[d] in hands-on
work for their formal degree program" were excluded from FLSA protection).
218. See Tsuruda, supra note 21, Part II.
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criteria, such as whether the volunteer appears at a posted date and
location. 219 So long as you can help garden in some capacity, it may not
matter whether you can lift heavy bags of dirt or skillfully prune a rose bush
for purposes of volunteering at a community garden. And this is a good
thing. By de-emphasizing flawless performance, such organizations facilitate
social bonds with people from different walks of life, people with radically
different educational backgrounds and physical abilities. Further, by
focusing on aspects of the cooperation beyond the quality of the product
produced, volunteer work can be communicatively powerful, expressing that
the point of the work is to enjoy one another's company, to overcome social
barriers, and to share responsibility for one another's wellbeing. 220
Treating commitments to volunteer like service contracts would, in
contrast, bring performance to the fore. Consider, for instance, the
stringency of the duty of performance that arises from finding that a service
contract exists. Part of the purpose of having a service contract is to ensure
that the people you hire know how to perform that, for instance, you want
your roof to be one color rather than another. 22' Hence, even though flawed
performance may not amount to a material breach, the promisor may still be
liable for the monetary value of the defects in her performance. Volunteers,
fearful of incurring liability for defective performance, might reasonably ask
one another, or the associations for which they volunteer, to be very clear
and specific about what they want. Once I can become liable for the quality
of my performance, it really starts to matter to me whether I am supposed to
plant a magnolia in our community garden rather than a palm. Such a
concern is not always inappropriate, but the risk of liability for performance
shifts the focus away from the larger aims and values of the cooperation to

219. See id. This is in contrast to professional volunteering. But professionals, such as
licensed physicians and attorneys, already have no right to minimum wage in virtue of their
professional status. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (exempting people employed in a "bona fide . .
professional capacity" from wage and hour provisions); 29 C.F.R. § 541.304 (2004)
(explaining that licensed attorneys and physicians are employed in a "bona fide professional
capacity" under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)). Minimum wage exemptions for volunteers are thus not
oriented towards facilitating professional volunteerism.
220. See Tsuruda, supra note 21, Part II.
221. Compare OW. Grun Roofing and Constr. Co. v. Cope, 529 S.W.2d 258, 263 (1975)
(holding that substantial performance was not tendered because the uniform color of the roof
was an essential part of the contract), with Jacob & Youngs, Inc., v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921)
(holding that the defendant could not withhold payment even though the plaintiff installed a
different brand pipe than the defendant requested in part because the pipes were of the same
type and quality).
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the particular product produced and, thus, away from the things that made
the volunteer work a unique arena to begin with.222
Contract liability for minor defects in performance may also discourage
people from volunteering who may feel that they are not that good at
performing, or who may be unsure about how long they could make a
commitment to volunteer people with no prior experience or with busy
work and family lives, people with disabilities, or certain elderly people.
Part of what makes volunteer work a distinctive and potentially valuable
form of social cooperation is the work's potential to facilitate bonds of
friendship and civility between people who might not otherwise encounter
one another in the paid workplace 223 or in their preexisting social circles.
Contract liability for minor flaws in performance may therefore undermine
volunteer work's potential for inclusivity. The risk of incurring liability may
also undermine the spontaneity of volunteer work. People might no longer
feel comfortable dropping by their local shelter to help out of fear that
should they need to leave a little early or volunteer inconsistently, they
might incur liability for incomplete performance.
3.

Discriminationand AssociationalFreedom

Duties arising from employment contracts may similarly be in tension
with the value of volunteer work. Consider, for example, the duty that
employers not discriminate on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin" in their selection of employees. 224 Such a duty is essential to

222. Of course, there are certain kinds of volunteer work for which quality performance
is absolutely essential, such as volunteer medical and construction work. But in contrast to the
service and construction contract context, performance in such voluntary contexts does not
matter because of the intent of the relevant parties or the particulars of their promissory
relationship. Quality medical care and safe housing are public policy issues, and their
provision can be (and often is) regulated through legislation (and of course criminal and tort
law).
223. For a thoughtful discussion of the potential for the paid workplace to bring diverse
people together, see generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE
BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003). Even if the paid workplace can bring
people together from diverse backgrounds, that potential is still limited by the meritocratic
features of the workplace and the content of the primary work being done. For example,
employees at an investment bank might come from a variety of backgrounds (even
educational, assuming that people in different roles interact with one another in supportive and
meaningful ways). Yet differences in moral and political beliefs across a society may mean
that those working at the bank systematically encounter only a small segment of the
population, and do not encounter people who fundamentally disagree with their kind of work
or have radically different life projects and interests.
224. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2015). I take an inclusive
view of the content of a contract, according to which the content of a contract is not limited to
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ensuring that each member of society is able to secure the goods that they
need on an equal basis. 225 Employment discrimination law also aims at
realizing people's equal moral status in one of the most central and
pervasive forms of social cooperation-a society's scheme of labor and
production. 226

Yet in part because of employment law's strong commitment to
workplace equality (and, of course, because of the democratic values that
require such a commitment), people may be limited in their ability to interact
with and realize conceptions of the good in the paid workplace. Such limits
are, of course, desirable (for all the reasons noted above).227 But just because
a value would be inappropriate to realize in the paid workplace does not
mean it should have no context for its realization.
For example, a group aiming to facilitate women's community
engagement may want to limit its membership to women. Similarly, a
church may want to limit its clerical positions to religious adherents.
Treating commitments to volunteer like employment contracts would thus
yield one of two undesirable results: either people would no longer be
permitted to realize those moral and religious aims through their cooperative
activity with one another, or we would have to give up on full workplace
equality. 228 Extending antidiscrimination norms in employment contracts to

volunteer settings may thus sometimes undermine volunteer work's value as
a locus for engaging with and realizing a plurality of values (that might not
be appropriately or freely realizable in the paid workplace).
To be clear, this is not to say that voluntary organizations should have
carte blanche to discriminate. Volunteer organizations may interact with the
public in ways that parallel public accommodations. It is also not clear that
antidiscrimination is always in tension with the internal norms of the
organization. 229 For instance, why would Doctors Without Borders need to

the intent of the parties as expressed in a contractual agreement, but also includes the full
range of legal duties and default terms the law imposes on the particular kind of promissory
relationship formed by the parties. Hence, employment law, in my view, is part of the content
of an employment contract.
225. See id.

226. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) (explaining that
employment discrimination law aims to bring about "equality of employment opportunities").
227. See ESTLUND, supra note 223, at 8-10, 34, 125.
228. I am suggesting here that a strong commitment to workplace equality recommends
rejecting the ministerial exception to employment law. I argue for this position in Sabine

Tsuruda, Why the Equality View of Religious Liberty Should Reject the Ministerial
Exemption (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
229. Indeed, I argue elsewhere that antidiscrimination protections may be required by the
inclusivity values of volunteer work. See Tsuruda, supra note 21, at 27-29.
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engage in racial discrimination in either its membership or who it treats?230
My point is rather that employment contract norms should not be adopted
wholesale to enforce volunteer commitments because those norms may
sometimes be in tension with the associational values of volunteering.
VII. CONCLUSION

Under the donative promise principle, a promise of a gift is typically
unenforceable in contract unless the promisee foreseeably changes her
financial position in reliance on the promise. The donative promise principle
is an inegalitarian principle. Donative promises are often made against a
background of profound social and economic inequality, and many people
rely on gifts to meet their basic needs. Promisees are hence susceptible to
promisors' attempts at using promised gifts as inducements to conform to
promisors' values and wishes. A reliance-based regime perversely supplies
legal reasons to conform to such attempts and to thereby rely on the
promises in foreseeable ways. Meanwhile, promisees who are too poor to
change their circumstances in reliance on the promises are left dependent on
the whim of promisors for continued access to basic goods and services.
Enforcement in the absence of reliance could relieve promisees of such
perverse reasons to rely and publicly repudiate the otherwise vulnerable
status of indigent promisees.
Commentators nevertheless worry that enforcement in the absence of
reliance would taint donative relationships by obscuring the promisor's
motive, leaving it unclear whether the gift was ultimately given out of, for
example, friendship, or from fear of legal sanctions. In response, I have
argued that the specter of enforcement need not obscure promisors' motives,
at least not any more so than criminal sanctions might obscure people's
motives for stopping their cars at crosswalks or taking care of children.
Indeed, enforcement could actually enhance the authenticity of donative
relationships by lessening the risk that the promised gift will be interpreted
as a carrot to conform to the promisor's wishes. Enforcement could also
facilitate trust by obviating reasons to strategically overinvest in the promise
and create contingency plans.
But donative promises are not homogenous. Gift giving occurs within a
variety of social settings characterized by different power dynamics and
moral values, some of which may be ill-served by contract principles. The
underexamined case of volunteer work offers such an example. People often
perform volunteer work to improve their job prospects. Enforcement would

230. I am indebted to Seana Shiffrin for this point.
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thus worsen the power imbalance between volunteers and volunteer
organizations. Holding volunteers liable for minor defects in their work (as
with service contracts) would also undermine volunteerism's potential to
engage people with different skills and abilities, and hence, would
undermine volunteerism's inclusivity.
Many donative promises should therefore be enforceable in the absence
of reliance, but enforcement will need to be calibrated to the power
dynamics and moral values that characterize different kinds of donative
promises.
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